Bowdoin College

Bowdoin Digital Commons
Honors Projects

Student Scholarship and Creative Work

2021

Stuck in Limbo: Temporary Protected Status, Climate Migrants
and the Expanding Definition of Refugees in the United States
Noelia Calcaño

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/honorsprojects

Recommended Citation
Calcaño, Noelia, "Stuck in Limbo: Temporary Protected Status, Climate Migrants and the Expanding
Definition of Refugees in the United States" (2021). Honors Projects. 294.
https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/honorsprojects/294

This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship and Creative Work
at Bowdoin Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Projects by an authorized administrator
of Bowdoin Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdoyle@bowdoin.edu, a.sauer@bowdoin.edu.

Stuck in Limbo: Temporary Protected Status, Climate Migrants and the Expanding Definition of
Refugees in the United States

An Honors Thesis for the Department of Government and Legal Studies
By Noelia Calcaño Silvestre

Bowdoin College, 2021
©2021 Noelia Calcaño

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... ii
Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................................1
Chapter 2: El Salvador 2001 Earthquake............................................................................35
Chapter 3: Honduras and Nicaragua Hurricane Mitch........................................................55
Chapter 4: Conclusion.........................................................................................................80

ii

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my honors and academic advisor Dr. Elias for her
unwavering support in the past four years and during the course of this project. Your genuine
eagerness and insightful feedback pushed me to be bold and creative, I could not have done this
without you.

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my committee members Dr. Shana Starobin
and Dr. Túlio Zille for making my passion their own with their suggestions and invaluable
contributions to this honors project. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Chryl
Laird for her continued support behind the scenes of this project and during my entire Bowdoin
career.

I cannot begin to express my thanks to everyone who helped me conduct my research including
Bill Frelick from the Human Rights Watch's refugee program, as well as Barbara Levergood and
Carmen Greenlee from the Bowdoin Library.

I could not have completed this thesis without the support of my friends and roommates, from
giving words of encouragement to providing welcome distractions to rest my mind outside of my
research, thank you for always believing in me.

Finally, I would like to thank God and my family for always reminding me “si se puede,” I owe
this all to you.

iii

Chapter 1: Introduction
There will be up to 1.2 billion climate refugees by 2050 as ecological disasters precipitate
mass migrations and greater armed conflict around the world.1 The U.S. does not legally
recognize climate migrants as refugees, instead adhering to the 1951 UN Convention on
Refugees that limits the legal definition of refugee to individuals facing state-based political
persecution specifically someone with a “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it.”2
Despite failing to expand the definition of a refugee, the U.S. has accommodated
migrants displaced by natural disasters through a series of ad hoc, temporary fixes, most notably
“Temporary Protected Status” (TPS). Temporary Protected Status is a form of humanitarian
protection that the Secretary of Homeland Security may designate due to conditions in a country
that temporarily prevent the country's nationals from returning safely or if the receiving country
is unable to handle the safe return of its nationals. A country may be designated for TPS for an
ongoing armed conflict, extraordinary and temporary conditions and natural disasters.3 In the

1

Bahel Kamal. “Climate Migrants Might Reach One Billion by 2050 - World.” ReliefWeb, August 21, 2017.
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/climate-migrants-might-reach-one-billion-2050.
2
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
UN Refugee Agency, 1951. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relatingstatus-refugees.html.
3
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Temporary Protected Status.” What it TPS, March 23, 2021.
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status.
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case of Central American countries, climate catastrophes have been the reason for TPS
designations on the grounds that, “an environmental disaster, such as an earthquake, hurricane,
or epidemic, that results in a substantial but temporary disruption of living conditions, and
because of which the foreign state is temporarily unable to adequately handle the return of its
nationals.”4
This status has applied to El Salvador since March 9, 2001 in response to the 2001 El
Salvador earthquakes and to both Honduras and Nicaragua since Jan 5, 1999 after Hurricane
Mitch struck Central America in 1998. Though the natural disasters that informed the initial TPS
designations for these countries took place more than two decades ago, subsequent extensions
continue to cite that the environmental conditions which led to the original designation continue
to exist. In analyzing the factors cited in the TPS extensions for Honduras, El Salvador and
Nicaragua, the U.S. has considered the impact of the original natural disaster and its aftereffects
in every 18-month period that the designations have been extended. All the while, country
conditions reports are citing long-standing problems like the economy, infrastructure, public
health, safety and security and governance as the factors informing TPS extensions in these
countries. Isolating environmental reasons for insecurity is difficult, in particular from
humanitarian, social, conflict, political or economic ones, yet the U.S. continues harking back to
the environment to justify continued TPS protections for Central American migrants.
In turn, we encounter the paradox of the U.S. employing environmental disasters to
justify continued extensions of a humanitarian protection that was intended to be temporary
while addressing chronic conditions in these Central American countries. Despite this, there is

4

Jill H Wilson. “Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure.” Congressional Research Service,
April 9, 2021, 24.
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surprisingly little scholarship taking an interdisciplinary lens to analyze the intersection of
climate migrants, international refugee law and U.S. politics in shaping Temporary Protected
Status. An outstanding puzzle remains, has employing the environment as a catch-all tool for
Temporary Protected Status protection expanded the de facto definition of a “refugee,” for
Central American migrants impacted by climate catastrophes and if so, how? As hundreds of
thousands of Central American foreign nationals depend on TPS to live and work legally in the
United States, the precarious foundation of this status must be brought to question as it begins to
face an uncertain future.

TPS, Refugee Status and Climate Change
Central Americans that do not qualify for refugee status are often nevertheless protected
by humanitarian-based U.S. immigration programs such as TPS. The United States currently
grants “Temporary Protected Status” to approximately 411,000 foreign nationals from 10
countries: El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria,
and Yemen. As of 2016 estimates when recipients were last asked to re-register, there are
195,000 Salvadoreans, 57,000 Hondurans, and 2,550 Nicaraguans with Temporary Protected
Status.5 Unlike other humanitarian-based immigration programs, TPS has been extended or redesignated under both Republican and Democratic administrations due to ongoing armed conflict
and extraordinary and temporary environmental conditions.6 George W. Bush authorized the
TPS program in the Immigration Act of 1990, Honduras was designated for TPS under President
5

D’Vera Cohn, Jeffrey S. Passel, and Kristen Bialik. “Many Immigrants with Temporary Protected Status Face
Uncertain Future in U.S.” Pew Research Center, November 27, 2017. https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/11/27/immigrants-temporary-protected-status-in-us/.
6
Will Swanson. “Behind the Headlines: Temporary Protected Status.” International Rescue Committee (IRC), July
26, 2018. https://www.rescue.org/article/behind-headlines-temporary-protected-status.
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Clinton in 1999 and both the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration extended TPS
for Central Americans from El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua with their reason being that it
was unsafe for foreign nationals to return.7 More than one-half of El Salvadoran and Honduran
TPS beneficiaries have resided in the United States for 20 years or more.8 Out of these foreign
nationals, more than a quarter arrived in the U.S. under the age of 16.9 These TPS recipients now
call the United States home and have established their lives, careers and typically plan their
future endeavors in the U.S.
Consequently, the large number of Central American TPS holders have established
substantial economic and family ties during their time in the United States. A Center for
American Progress analysis of the 2017 1-year American Community Survey, which details
population and housing information about our nation, found that more than 250,000 US- citizen
children live in households with family members who hold Temporary Protected Status.10 If TPS
is rescinded, families face the risk of being separated from their U.S. born citizen children or be
forced to migrate as a family to another country. Additionally, Central American TPS holders are
integral members of the U.S. economy and are employed at high rates, ranging from 69.2 to 83.5
percent which is well above the rate for the total US population (63 percent).11 This demonstrates

7

Jill H Wilson. “Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure.” Congressional Research Service,
April 9, 2021, 24.
8
Robert Warren, and Donald Kerwin. “A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status
Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti.” The Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) 5, no. 3
(2017): 577–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/233150241700500302.
9
Robert Warren, and Donald Kerwin. “A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status
Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti.”
10
Leila Schochet, and Nicole Prchal Svajlenka. “How Ending TPS Will Hurt U.S.-Citizen Children.” Center for
American Progress, February 11, 2019.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2019/02/11/466022/ending-tps-will-hurt-u-s-citizenchildren/.
11
Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Angie Bautista-Chavez, and Laura Muñoz Lopez. “TPS Holders Are Integral Members
of the U.S. Economy and Society.” Center for American Progress, October 20, 2017.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2017/10/20/440400/tps-holders-are-integral-membersof-the-u-s-economy-and-society/.
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how TPS holders economically contribute to their communities. Additionally, home ownership, a
quintessential component of the American dream, stands at roughly 30 percent for Salvadoran
and Honduran TPS holders who have set down roots in the United States by getting mortgages.12
Going beyond economic contributions, a nationwide survey of Central American immigrants
holding TPS found that nearly 30% of respondents volunteered in civic organizations,
committees, or community groups while 20% engaged in activities to benefit their community
including donating blood or cleaning streets.13 These activities indicate the high levels of social
integration TPS recipients have achieved during their time in the U.S. Despite their uncertain
future in the U.S., TPS holders have established deeply rooted ties that bind them to the local
communities they are a part of.
The integration of Central American migrants into U.S. society represents the ways in
which people set up their lives around immigration protections and policies, counting on national
immigration relief when international law and its limits placed on the definition of a refugee fails
them.
Argument
Though the original intent of TPS was to provide a temporary safe haven, have repeated
extensions established the program as de facto amnesty? TPS has not been codified as a form of
permanent protection in U.S. law which leaves recipients vulnerable to the Secretary of
Homeland Security's discretion to determine whether conditions in Central America justify

12

Robert Warren, and Donald Kerwin. 2017. “A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected
Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti.”
13
Cecilia Menjívar. “Temporary Protected Status in the United States: The Experiences Of Honduran And
Salvadoran Immigrants.” Center for Migration Research, The University of Kansas., May 2017,
https://ipsr.ku.edu/migration/pdf/TPS_Report.pdf
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protection.14 While Temporary Protected Status is a temporary designation that has to be
renewed every 18 months, the U.S. government has repeatedly extended the status for more than
two decades in the case of Central American countries, contingent upon the finding that conflict
and extraordinary conditions continue to exist, making it unsafe for foreign nationals in the U.S.
to return. As of the end of fiscal year 2019, El Salvador’s had been extended 18 times; its most
recent extension was set to expire in January 2020.15 Similarly, Nicaragua was granted
Temporary Protected Status two decades ago and saw repeated extensions. TPS for Honduran
nationals has also been extended continuously, with the current authorization lasting through
January 5, 2020.16
The repeated extension of TPS for Central American recipients these past two decades
demonstrates that this designation has been employed as a mechanism to expand protective
status for migrants ineligible for asylum, but nevertheless subject to ongoing armed conflict or an
environmental disaster. As such, the designation is responding to critical protection gaps that
exist in the current domestic and international refugee protection regime. Protection gaps
describe inadequacies in the protection afforded to forcibly displaced persons where existing
refugee law is too limited in scope.17 TPS has become a pathway to fill a gap in migrant
protections within the U.S., but more work needs to be done to understand the implications of
providing repeated temporary protection to migrants without a path to legal status.

14

Jill H Wilson, Andorra Bruno, Jennifer K Elsea, William A Kandel, Lawrence Kapp, Rhoda Margesson, Peter J
Meyer, Clare Ribando Seelke, Audrey Singer, and Maureen Taft-Morales. “Recent Migration to the United States
from Central America: Frequently Asked Questions,” January 29, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45489.pdf
15
The United States Department of Justice. “Temporary Protected Status.” The Most Recent TPS Notices, January
13, 2015. https://www.justice.gov/eoir/temporary-protected-status.
16
Jill H Wilson. “Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure.” Congressional Research Service,
April 9, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS20844.pdf.
17
Volker Türk, and Rebecca Dowd. “Protection Gaps - Oxford Handbooks.” Oxford Handbooks Online, August
2014.https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/oxfordhb9780199652433-e-024.
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The protections awarded to TPS recipients who have experienced armed conflict and
environmental disasters aim to fill gaps left by the UN Refugee Convention. Despite the
convention’s limited definition, migrants fleeing environmental degradation in the Central
American dry corridor are propelling emigration in the region. Though the issue of climate
change and its impact on food security is driving migration from the Northern Triangle,
comprising El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, climate migrants are not legally recognized
as refugees according to international or U.S. refugee law. A 2015 study carried out by the
Institute for Environment and Human Security of the United Nations suggests that there will be
200 million environmental migrants by 2050.18 Migrants fleeing because of poverty and hunger
do not qualify for asylum because international asylum laws protect people fleeing political
persecution, not the effects of climate change such as natural disasters and conflict. I argue the
international convention is too limited in scope as it does not encompass how these new factors
are a fundamental threat to the livelihoods and economic security of Central American migrants
seeking asylum, leaving the U.S. with ad hoc solutions to mounting pressures. Though climate
migrants are not considered refugees, the protection awarded to TPS recipients fleeing
environmental disasters has broadened the de facto definition of a refugee, albeit imperfectly. In
turn, climate change is gradually creating a new kind of refugee that is not restricted by the state
as a persecuting agent.
In trying to address why people migrate, humanitarian programs emphasize the
importance of "push" and "pull" factors. USCIS provides a number of humanitarian programs
and protection to assist individuals in need of shelter or aid and identify political oppression and

18

Bahel Kamal. “Climate Migrants Might Reach One Billion by 2050 - World.” ReliefWeb, August 21, 2017.
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/climate-migrants-might-reach-one-billion-2050.
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natural disasters as urgent push factors that would warrant protection.19 Push factors are
identified as circumstances that repel migrants from their home country while pull factors are
circumstances in the destination country that attract migrants to move.20 Common push factors
include, “persecution, violence, poor wages, natural disasters, crop failure and famine, as well as
lack of access to opportunities and essential services.” On the other hand, common pull factors
are, “safety and stability, higher wages and job prospects, food availability and a better
environment as well as a better quality of life and access to essential services.”21 Though TPS
fills a critical gap in the refugee protection regime, it does so by employing climate and
environmental factors as a catch-all category for providing protection to individuals caught in a
complex set of economic, social, and environmental factors. There are ideological and political
reasons for utilizing ecological and environmental disasters as a catch-all protection category
under Temporary Protected Status. In addition to non-state violence, climate change-induced
environmental threats “push” Northern Triangle migrants to flee their home countries.
In this thesis I’m focusing on the climate catastrophes because climate-induced
environmental disasters are being employed to cover economic, social, and political push factors
under the Temporary Protected Status instrument of the US protection regime. The environment
becomes a catch-all category because environmental disasters are perceived as apolitical as
opposed to economic, social, and political push factors which become highly politicized in the
context of immigration policy. Because TPS protects against circumstances bringing about a

19

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Humanitarian Programs and Protection.” Humanitarian
Programs, July 15, 2020. https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian.
20
National Immigration Forum. “Push or Pull Factors: What Drives Central American Migrants to the U.S.?,” July
3, 2019. https://immigrationforum.org/article/push-or-pull-factors-what-drives-central-american-migrants-to-the-us/.
21
Justice for Immigrants: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. “Root Causes of Migration.” Root Causes
of Migration, February 14, 2017. https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigration/root-causesof-migration/.
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“substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions,” natural hazards and disasters are
more palatable as factors that are deserving of temporary protection. Unlike victims of violence
and political persecution, with climate migrants the perpetrators are not identifiable which
contributes to the apoliticization of humanitarian protection in cases involving environmental
disasters. The United Nations University, which is the academic and research arm of the United
Nations, reaffirmed that climate victims are, “different from the victims of violent crimes, which
are committed by clearly identifiable perpetrators and dealt with by the law enforcement and
criminal justice systems. With climate change victims, in contrast, the perpetrators are not
identifiable and traditional criminal justice, based on investigating crimes and prosecuting
perpetrators, would not work.”22
The idea that something occurring in the environment is not political may explain why
environmental disasters have been embraced as a rightful justification for temporary protection.
This phenomenon represents a willingness to acknowledge environmental disasters victims as
deserving of short-term protection, though TPS has continually been renewed for Central
American recipients over the past two decades. There is a difference in how country conditions
that are push factors for migration are handled like temporary issues or chronic problems. In
filling the gaps left by the US asylum system, it has been more politically palatable to tackle
environmental disasters as temporary crises, not systemic and deep-seated consequences arising
from climate change. Such a framing of temporary status for a temporary crisis removes US
culpability in the economic, social, and political factors that contribute to a disruption of living
conditions in Central American TPS countries. Though my project cannot fully address the

22

Vesselin Popovski. “Climate Change Victims - United Nations University.” Climate change victims, December 1,
2011. https://unu.edu/publications/articles/climate-change-victims.html.
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complex history of development and neoliberal policies, it is important to acknowledge how the
United States had a strong hand in catalyzing civil wars and how the legacy of conflict in Central
American has generated chronic insecurity in the region. Temporary Protected Status leverages
natural disasters to avoid addressing systemic problems that cannot be solved with temporary
solutions.
TPS protects against human induced climate change, yet migrants are being pushed into a
relatively simple category, utilized in ways that both denies and acknowledges controversial
drivers of migration. Employing Temporary Protected Status to fill gaps in the US asylum
system creates a paradox of limiting narrow categories and creating catch-all ones. The
humanitarian protection regime is at once too broad and too narrow as the 1951 Refugee
Convention adopts a very narrow definition of a refugee while TPS attempts to fill that narrow
definition by creating catch-all categories. Environmental disasters being utilized as a tool that
guarantees protection creates a benefit for economic migrants traditionally unprotected in the US
asylum system. We cannot neatly separate refugees from economic migrants who flee their home
in search of a higher standard of living, yet the current U.S. refugee laws and policies solely
protect a foreign national facing persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. In this phenomenon, we witness a
duality in the refugee regime, with a tension being that the category of refugee is narrow in
addressing the growing effects of climate change, yet TPS avoids the political consequences of
addressing other push factors in attempting to fill this gap. The ways in which TPS is being
employed as a catch-all category for environmental protection helps me address the question of
how has Temporary Protected Status expanded the definition of 'refugees' for Central American
migrants impacted by climate catastrophes? Temporary Protected Status centers the environment
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in its designations while acknowledging the complex push factors driving migration including
social, economic, and political factors and by extension, expanding the de facto definition of a
refugee.

Key definitions
Because many of the arguments presented in this thesis rest on particular definitions, detailed
definitions are clarified here.
Refugee: Someone with a “well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.”23
Asylum seeker: An asylum-seeker is someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be
processed.24
Migrant: In general, is a person who has temporarily or permanently crossed an international
border, is no longer residing in his or her country of origin or habitual residence, and is not
recognized as a refugee. Migrants may include asylum seekers.
Environmental Migrant: “persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden
or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions,

23

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
UN Refugee Agency, 1951. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relatingstatus-refugees.html.
24
Asylum-Seekers. “UNHCR - Asylum-Seekers.” Accessed May 6, 2021. https://www.unhcr.org/asylumseekers.html.
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are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently,
and who move either within their country or abroad.”25
Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD): The predecessor to TPS prior to the Immigration Act
of 1990. ary authority granted by the Attorney General to give nationals of countries
experiencing war or instability to remain in the United States.26
Unconventional violence: Violence inflicted by nonstate actors outside an official context of
war or armed conflict.
Particular Social Group (PSG): One of the grounds used to claim asylum according to the
1951 Refugee Convention.
Violent non-state actors (VNSAs)/ armed non-state actors (ANAs): Actors that apply the use
of force - in different forms - for pursuing their political or economic ends.27
Temporary Protected Status (TPS): “Establishes a program for granting temporary protected
status and work authorization to aliens in the United States who are nationals of countries
designated by the Attorney General to be subject to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other
extraordinary temporary conditions.”28

25

Frank Laczko, and International Organization for Migration, eds. Migration, Environment and Climate Change:
Assessing the Evidence. Geneva: Internat. Organization for Migration, 2009.
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_and_environment.pdf
26
American Immigration Council. “Temporary Protected Status: An Overview,” August 24, 2017.
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/temporary-protected-status-overview.
27
Anja P Jakobi. “Non-State Violence and Political Order,” August 2010,
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/121254/4_jakobi_PRIF_working_paper2.pdf
28
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
UN Refugee Agency, 1951. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relatingstatus-refugees.html.
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Historical Events and Historical Context- TPS Status and Central America
Though the United States employs the legal definition of the term refugee as set out in the
1951 UN Refugee Convention, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) has historically provided an
alternative for Central American migrants struck by factors that do not qualify as persecuting
agents according to the parameters set by the convention. International refugee law was officially
codified in the Convention and Protection Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 and its
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees declares that a refugee is an individual, “who owing to a well-founded
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”29
Though the 1951 Refugee Convention addresses the protection of persecuted refugees, it
does not draw attention to the protection of refugees fleeing general conflict that does not
involve targeted, individual persecution. Under the convention, asylum seekers must prove they
have an individualized well-founded fear of persecution to be granted refugee status. On the
issue of Civil war and other generalized conflicts, point 6 of the position of the European Union
(member states) as regards persecution by non-state agents states that, “reference to civil war or
internal or generalized armed conflict and the dangers it entails is not itself sufficient to warrant

29

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
UN Refugee Agency, 1951. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relatingstatus-refugees.html.
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the grant of refugee status. Fear of persecution must in all cases be individual in nature.”30
Individuals who are not targets of persecution but nevertheless have well founded fears of
returning to their home countries are excluded from the definition of a refugee.31 Although the
individual need for protection is fundamentally important for refugee protection, the large scale
displacement of victims of armed conflicts and non-state violence signals that vulnerable
populations beyond these limited parameters merit consideration for protection.32
Importantly, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention focuses on the state, but refugees fleeing
their homes in today’s world are facing new forms of displacement such as those related to
natural disasters and climate change. The 1951 Convention does not define the identity of the
persecuting agent while assessing refugee status claims brought forth by migrants experiencing a
fear of persecution at the hands of non-governmental persons or entities. The UNHCR Handbook
is not a binding legal document, but courts have employed it as an instrument for legal guidance.
Paragraph 65 of the UNHCR Handbook states, “persecution is normally related to action by the
authorities of a country. It may also emanate from sections of the population that do not respect
the standards established by the laws of the country concerned.”33
Although it is widely accepted that persecution is carried out by state actors, when it
comes to recognizing non-state actors as persecutors, implementation is divided. There are two
main approaches taken in the question of whether victims of non‐state persecution are afforded
protection by the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. The general position taken is that

30

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “ELENA Research Paper on Non-State Agents of Persecution.”
Refworld, September 1, 2000. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3460.html.
31
Claire Bergeron. "Temporary Protected Status after 25 Years: Addressing the ...." Accessed 8 Oct. 2020.
https://cmsny.org/publications/jmhs-temporary-protected-status-after-25-years/.
32
Hector Gros Espiell, Sonia Picado, and Leo Valladares Lanza. “Principles And Criteria For The Protection Of
And Assistance To Central American Refugees, Returnees And Displaced Persons In Latin America.” International
Journal of Refugee Law 2, no. 1 (1990): 83–117. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/2.1.83.
33
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “ELENA Research Paper on Non-State Agents of Persecution.”
Refworld, September 1, 2000. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3460.html.
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the United States subscribes to the “protection theory” which holds that “persecution” can also
be inflicted by non-state actors so long as the government has been unable or unwilling to afford
them protection.34 However, this is not the case as applied to Central American asylum claims.
US law now adopts an approach to non‐state persecution that more closely aligns with
“accountability theory” which restricts the sense of “persecution” to harm emanating from the
state.35 These are the two approaches by which protection is afforded to victims of persecution
by non‐State actors through the 1951 Convention.
In the case of Central American refugee claims in the US, protective status is almost
always denied to those fleeing this violence because the threats facing asylum seekers are
considered unconventional violence, that is violence inflicted by nonstate actors outside an
official context of war or armed conflict. Celia Medrano articulates that, “in the absence of wars
or internal conflicts involving state actors, traditional aid and humanitarian action mechanisms
are difficult to activate in other words, because the persecuted are not victimized by government
agents due to membership in a protected group, they do not qualify for refugee status.”36 The
Temporary Protected Status program has filled gaps left by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention’s
articulation of what constitutes a refugee.
The American asylum and refugee laws originally responded to refugee problems
stemming from World War II. As such, these laws do not adequately address many modern
agents of persecution, including civil unrest caused by violent non state actors and environmental

34

House of Lords of the United Kingdom. “Select Committee on European Union Twenty-Eighth Report:
Persecution: The Role Of Non-State Actors.” Accessed May 6, 2021.
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldselect/ldeucom/156/15604.htm.
35
Francesco Maiani. “The Concept of ‘Persecution’ in Refugee Law: Indeterminacy, Context-Sensitivity, and the
Quest for a Principled Approach.” Les Dossiers Du Grihl, February 28, 2010.
http://journals.openedition.org/dossiersgrihl/3896.
36
Ethics & International Affairs. “Securing Protection for De Facto Refugees: The Case of Central America’s
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harm. Since President Eisenhower, executive action has been employed to protect other sorts of
migrants facing circumstances that fail to meet the limited definition of a refugee. For example,
in 1956, President Eisenhower used an executive order to authorize the admission of foreignborn children adopted by American citizens overseas that were barred entry into the United
States.37 This shows than deferred action policies have been an integral component of
immigration enforcement for decades. In 1990, Congress codified the practice of granting
temporary relief by creating Temporary Protected Status (TPS) within the Immigration Act of
1990. The act represented a push towards extending the standard concept of a refugee beyond the
narrower scope of the 1951 Convention. Congress enacted Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
which directs the Attorney General to provide for a temporary stay of deportation and work
authorization to “aliens in the United States who are nationals of countries designated by the
Attorney General to be subject to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary
temporary conditions.”38
The program for granting temporary protected status to nationals is grounded on the
pretense that deportation is not safe for the individual. In this way, TPS protects designated
nationals from returning to countries where they face significant violence or widespread
destruction because they possess a “well-founded fear of death.” Representative Hamilton Fish
Jr. (R-NY) stated on the House Floor regarding a precursory Safe Haven Bill that, “the threat to
human life posed by war or natural disaster can be as great—or even greater—than the risk to
life posed by the threat of persecution.”39 This statement reflects the act’s intention to extend
37
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existing refugee and asylum laws to include environmentally-displaced persons, fundamentally
expanding ideas about the environment as a persecuting agent.
The push to protect asylum seekers fleeing civil wars in Central America precipitated the
passage of the Immigration Act of 1990. Though TPS was the first-time congress codified the
practice of granting temporary protection, asylum seekers displaced by environmental factors
and humanitarian crises were previously granted extended voluntary departure (EVD). This
reprieve from removal granted the president the right to exercise his executive powers to protect
nationals of countries experiencing war or instability. 40 In spite of the fact that El Salvador was
ravaged by human rights violations and violence brought by the civil war, the Attorney General
under Reagan denied EVD status to Salvadoran nationals.41 Due to the Reagan administration’s
refusal to grant extended voluntary departure (EVD) to Salvadorian nationals, the 1990
Immigration Act explicitly granted TPS to Salvadorans in 1990.42 The act, “designated El
Salvador as a country whose nationals are eligible for temporary protected status under the new
program, subject to specified restrictions.”43 House floor debates highlighted that in addition to
refugees fleeing political persecution, Temporary Protected Status recipients fleeing war and
environmental disasters also deserved to remain safely in the United States. The House Judiciary
Committee reported that, “in some circumstances an individual who cannot show persecution
may nonetheless be subjected to great danger if forced to return home.” 44 Effectively, the
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passing of TPS legislation extended the protections granted to migrants fleeing new forms of
displacement.
Following the passage of the Immigration Act in 1990, the settlement of American
Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh was a landmark victory for Central American asylum-seekers.
The historic lawsuit filed against the U.S. Attorney General and the head of the Immigration and
Naturalization Services raised systemic challenges to the processing of asylum claims filed by
Salvadorans and Guatemalans.45 The suit claimed that the defendants had violated the nation’s
commitment to the 1951 Refugee convention and domestic refugee laws because of their refusal
to grant asylum to nationals fleeing political hostility in the 1980s. The lawsuit held that, “the
same standard for determining whether or not an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution
applies to Salvadorans and Guatemalans as applies to all other nationalities.”46 They determined
that discrimination of Central American refugees was in violation of the Immigration Act of
1980, a precursor to the Immigration Act of 1990 that sought to protect asylum seekers fleeing
persecution and human rights abuses.47 The settlement allowed for asylum claims to be
adjudicated for refugees who were previously denied asylum. It is important to note that all the
while, the settlement also secured temporary protected status (TPS) for many Salvadoran and
Guatemalan nationals. Migrants became eligible for de novo asylum if they applied for
Temporary Protected Status within the statutory period.48 This settlement exhibits that American
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Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh was a landmark case not only for Central American migrants
but for the expansion of asylum, employing TPS as a mechanism.

Methodology
My research analyzing the role of temporary protected status in expanding the de facto
definition of a refugee and its relation to U.S. law takes a case study approach examining two
selected natural disasters that drove TPS designations for Central American countries: the
January 2001 El Salvador earthquake and Hurricane Mitch which struck Honduras and
Nicaragua. The case study approach can be defined as the detailed examination of an aspect of a
historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other
events.49 Case methods are valuable in testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory
development due to their ability to achieve high conceptual validity. Case studies allow for the
study of several variables important to this project, such as non-state actors, agents of
persecution and environmental degradation, which are difficult to measure quantitatively. Thus,
my study carries out a contextualized comparison which requires, “detailed consideration of
contextual factors, which is extremely difficult to do in statistical studies but is common in case
studies.” The case studies approach allows me to analyze contextual factors that statistical
methods struggle to quantify.
The case study approach also fosters strong procedures for testing new hypotheses. 50 My
research addresses the interaction of American Politics and International Relations, subfields in
political science that are often held apart despite areas of overlap such as foreign policy. These
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two sub-fields must be combined to understand how national humanitarian protection
frameworks in the United States have filled gaps in international protection. The case study
approach facilitates my analysis as it allows for, “new variables and hypotheses through the
study of deviant or outlier cases and in the course of field work—such as archival research.”51 In
my research, this comes in the form of examining declassified government documents about
factors that informed the TPS designation of Central American countries. I rely on both primary
and secondary sources to take on an interdisciplinary approach in research. My analysis
references secondary sources including news reports, journal articles, policy memos, and
government documents and datasets.

Literature Review
The idea that climate change and environmental degradation is triggering large-scale
human migration and creating new political problems related to seeking refuge and migration has
gained recognition in the past decades. In the absence of a universally agreed definition of the
term, the International Organization for Migrants developed a working definition which defines
“environmental migrants” as, “environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for
compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so,
either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.”52
Though climate politics scholars affirm that environmental disasters increase migration,
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opposing scholars argue that climate-induced disasters have negligible effects on international
migration (Bohra-Mishra, Oppenheimer, Hsiang53 and Paul,54 and Fussel55). Despite this, the
Ecological Threat Register (ETR) conducted by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
found that ecological disasters are driving mass migration and unprecedented levels of armed
conflict. Their report indicates that a staggering 1.2 billion people could be displaced by
environmental disasters by 2050.56 Research in climate politics affirms the climate-migration
nexus and its impact on migration.
Reid identifies that migration is the most extreme climate adoption strategy communities
can embrace when faced with an environmental disaster.57 In turn, scholars have argued that the
environment can be a primary factor by analyzing the ways in which climate-driven natural
disasters trigger mass human migration. Using panel data from developing countries, Berlemann
and Steinhardt evaluate the correlation between climate driven natural disasters and migration.
Their study confirms previous findings which indicate that natural disasters are positively
associated with emigration rates.58
Some scholars that affirm the climate-migration nexus have taken up the correlation
between climate induced disaster displacement and the ability of women to carry on political,
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economic, and social functions. Though she analyzes both natural and technological hazards,
Hunter’s study on Migration and Environmental Hazards has significant implications for how
natural disasters have become push factors of international migration. The findings demonstrate
that environmental pressures play a primary role in the decision to migrate for vulnerable
communities. She defines vulnerability as the “characteristics of a person or group in terms of
their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a hazard.” 59 By this
definition, the most vulnerable communities are those at the low end of the socio-economic
spectrum in developed and developing regions. These findings have a considerable impact on our
policy responses to environmental migration and displacement. Similarly, by analyzing case
studies of hurricane induced displacement in Vulnerability and Climate Change Induced Human
Displacement, Jayawardhan suggests that there is a significant relationship between
socioeconomically vulnerable communities and displacement.60 These findings have important
ramifications for addressing structural inequalities that increase vulnerability to climate change
in policy aimed at closing the legal protection gap for environmentally displaced migrants.
Following the assumption that climate change triggers migration, scholars within the field
of international relations have embraced the concept of ‘environmental refugees’ and classified
this type of migrant. A variety of actors such as Biermann and Boas,61 Docherty and Giannini62

59

Lori M Hunter. “Migration and Environmental Hazards.” Population and Environment 26, no. 4 (March 2005):
273–302. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-005-3343-x.
60
Shweta Jayawardhan. “Vulnerability and Climate Change Induced Human Displacement.” Environmental
Migration Portal. Columbia University, 2017. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8639VFH.
61
Frank Biermann, and Ingrid Boas. “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to
Protect Climate Refugees.” Global Environmental Politics 10 (February 1, 2010): 60–88.
https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2010.10.1.60.
62
Docherty Bonnie, and Giannini Tyler. “Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate
Change Refugees.” The Harvard Environmental Law Review: HELR 33 (January 1, 2009): 349–403.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263505945_Confronting_a_rising_tide_A_proposal_for_a_convention_on
_Climate_change_refugees

Calcano 22

and Prieur63 have proposed new legal instruments to address climate induced migration. Some
contend that the convention relating to the status of refugees is too limited in scope and the
international community should negotiate a new framework for environmentally displaced
persons.
Docherty focuses on environmental migrants in international law with the proposal of a
new legal instrument to confront the rise of climate refugees. The proposed treaty would be
designed and negotiated separate from existing legal regimes because of the limits of the climate
and refugee frameworks. In terms of who should take responsibility for protecting those
displaced because of environmental disasters and climate change, the comprehensive instrument
would spread the burden of protecting climate refugees across the home state, host state, and
international community.64 Similarly, in Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global
Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, Biermann and Boas argue for the
implementation of a new protocol that allows nations to resettle people displaced by the farreaching effects of climate change. The Protocol for the Recognition, Protection, and
Resettlement of Climate Refugees moves towards a global governance system for the protection
of climate refugees.65 Though the first treaty would spread out the burden of protecting climate
refugees, both proposals highlight the international community's responsibility to alleviate the
global climate change refugee situation.
On the other hand, some scholars oppose the assertion that the international community
should create a separate convention to address the issue of climate refugees who are forced to
63
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relocate across national borders. Based on fieldwork in Kiribati and Tuvalu, In Refusing 'Refuge'
in the Pacific: (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement in International Law Jane
McAdam challenged the idea that there should be a new international treaty for climate refugees.
She suggested that instead of a new international instrument, regional solutions might be more
appropriate for tackling the complex difficulties posed by protecting people fleeing the effects of
climate change. This work questions the degree to which environmental degradation should be
singled out as a decisive cause of large-scale migration in an international protection instrument
while paying no heed to other displacement drivers. In addition to acknowledging the impacts of
the climate-migration nexus, this perspective emphasizes the impact of interconnected factors
such as poverty and conflict. McAdam identifies that a pragmatic difficulty in designing a
climate refugee instrument would be that, “states presently lack the political will to negotiate a
new instrument requiring them to provide international protection to additional classes of people,
and that even if they did, its ratification, implementation and enforcement could not be easily
compelled.”66 By highlighting the significant obstacle in achieving treaty-based solutions and the
limitations of a treaty, McAdam details the advantages of regional based solutions to
environmental migration.
Similarly, Paramjit S. Jaswal and Stellina Jolly propose a human rights approach to
climate-induced displacement that is spearheaded by nation states as opposed to the international
community in Climate Refugees: Challenges and Opportunities for International Law. They
suggest that states should consider establishing alternative forms of protection for migrants who
do not qualify as refugees but face conditions in their country of origin that make it unsafe to
return. Their findings indicate that one of such mechanisms can be found in the US approach
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through the enactment of Temporary Protected Status as it protects migrants fleeing an
environmental disaster resulting in substantial disruption to living conditions.67 Though I do not
attempt to oppose or offer a policy proposal that would secure international protection for people
displaced by climate change, the proposals for new legal instruments to legally recognize the
rights awarded to climate refugees allude to the ways in which the existing international legal
framework does not adequately address the emerging refugee crisis.
Non-state actors have emerged as key protagonists in the new international security
order. Jakobi defines violent non-state actors as, “actors that apply the use of force - in different
forms - for pursuing their political or economic ends.”68 Research on global governance within
the field of international relations has focused on the ways in which non-state actors have played
an essential role in global regulation. Despite this, violence perpetrated by non-state actors has
now emerged as a new persecuting agent for Central American migrants. We have seen the rise
of the non-state actor as an agent of persecution and violence.
Scholars in international relations have focused on the relationship between non-state
violence and asylum applications, finding a significant and positive association. In Fragmented
State Power and Forced Migration: A Study on Non-State Actors in Refugee Law, Nykänen
asserted that, “it is highly likely that today’s refugees are fleeing dangers emanating from nonstate agents.”69 In identifying this development as having the most impact on refugee law during
the past ten years, the author highlights the significance of non-state actors triggering movements
of forced migrants. Nykänen’s work alludes to the ways in which international refugee law has
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traditionally focused on the relationship between nation-states. However, this conventional view
has not been broadened to include relationships of all sorts of political entities including nonstate actors which saw a rise during the era of globalization.
Conte and Migali quantified the relationship between non-state violence and asylum
applications in their demographic research into The Role of Conflict and Organized Violence in
International Forced Migration. By analyzing trends of increasing asylum applications and
refugee stocks, they examine the influence of non-state actors as a push factor. Their findings
showed that, “the number of total casualties generated by civil wars, non-state-based violence,
and one-sided violence against unarmed civilians (on the population at the country of origin) is
positively associated with new asylum applications. The higher the number of deaths caused by
any form of organized violence, the higher the number of first asylum applications.”70 These
results indicate that migrants flee to escape terror and war but also violence and insecurity
emerging from violent non-state actors.
Similarly, in the forced migration review feature Armed Non-State Actors and
Displacement, Couldrey and Herson determined that armed non-state actors play a significant
role generating forced displacement around the world. They assert that it is clear that, “ANSAs
[armed non-state actors] have been either directly or indirectly responsible for the forced
movement, deportation or non- movement of people.”71 ANAs are responsible for these forms of
human rights abuses by denying people access to safety, and for forcing return to unsafe
locations. The growth of violent non state actors has altered the national security landscape and
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given rise to new threats such as terrorism and transnational crime. A report titled Armed Non‐
State Actors and Displacement in Armed Conflict found that, “out of 73 million people who are
forcibly displaced, 43 million are fleeing armed conflict and persecution, and ANSAs were
reportedly the agents of displacement in a quarter of these conflict situations that generate
displacement.”72 Displacement caused by non-state actors has increased in the past decade.
Though there is an established international framework for other forms of displacement in
refugee law, there exist gaps in relation to the rise of violent non-state actors that regional
frameworks like TPS attempt to fill.
Some scholars in the field of international relations argue that policy aimed at closing the
legal protection gap for migrants displaced by violent non state actors should address the rise of
violent non state actors in global governance. In Asylum, Social Group Membership and the NonState Actor: The Challenge of Domestic Violence, Heyman critiques the process of asylum
claims based on "social group" membership under the U.N. convention Relation to the Status of
Refugees. In turn, Heyman suggests that courts adopt a consistent definition of what constitutes a
social group. This change would better accommodate the shift in immigration law as asylum
applicants are now increasingly seeking protection from persecution emanating from non-state
actors, not just the state which the convention protects.73 The article identifies that violent nonstate actors present a unique challenge to asylum law. Heyman articulates that, “though citizens
have a right to protection from threats, when the agent of persecution is not the state, it is
uncertain when the state's failure rises to an unacceptable level and warrants an asylum grant.”74
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This indicates the difficulty of identifying if the government has been unable or unwilling to
afford people persecuted by violent non-state actors with protection.
Kenneth Law also argues for modifying the particular protected group (PSG) to include
victims of non-state actor violence in Out of Options: The Obstructions Hindering Victims of
Non-State Actor Violence Under Current Asylum Law. The article advocates for having congress
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of a refugee to combat restrictions
inherent in the definition of a refugee. If congress embraced a different approach to interpreting
the PSG ground, Law asserts that it would ensure that Central American migrants fleeing
domestic or gang violence emanating from non-state actors are afforded protection.75
Scholarship on how Temporary Protected Status has been employed to help migrants
displaced by climate induced disasters and non-state actors can be divided into two categories.
First, there are scholars who oppose structural inadequacies in the TPS regime and the embedded
ambiguity inherent in this program in the lives of recipients. On the other hand, there are scholars
and activists who assert that TPS is filling a critical protection gap embedded within the Refugee
Convention.
In What’s Wrong With TPS and How to Fix It, Frelick analyzes the purpose and
effectiveness of the TPS statute by evaluating the structural limitations of the TPS program. First
and foremost, Frelick agrees with other scholars who question the effectiveness of TPS by
pointing to the legal limbo recipients are thrust into. He goes a step further than other scholars by
arguing that repeated extensions of TPS run counter to the congressional intent for TPS to be
used for temporary, short-term situations. Frelick’s most significant contribution is highlighting
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the fact that TPS only offers protections to, “nationals of the designated country who were
already in the United States at the time of the designation.”76 He highlights that TPS only
protects people already residing in the U.S. from deportation and allows them to work legally.
This calls attention to how one of the shortcomings of the program is that it does not benefit
migrants who were directly impacted by natural disasters, instead opting to protect foreign
nationals who cannot safely return to their countries of origin.
As scholars who oppose the liminal legality of TPS, both Hallet and Abrego challenge
the legal limbo TPS recipients find themselves in. Hallett centers the experiences of Salvadoran
migrants in rural Arkansas to understand whether TPS status is a benefit in Temporary
Protection, Enduring Contradiction: The Contested and Contradictory Meanings of Temporary
Immigration Status. While the status usually protects migrants from deportation and grants them
authorization to work in the U.S., it also makes migrants more susceptible to visibility and
surveillance at the hands of immigration enforcement. She articulates that migration policy
functions both to reproduce and to mask the benefits to the nation-state from the “ambiguous
inclusion and simultaneous exclusion of migrant workers.”77 Hallett highlights one of the
primary shortcomings of TPS status as it simultaneously fosters inclusion and exclusion for
recipients.
In Immigration Policies Hurt Immigrant Families More than They Help, Abrego further
criticized the uncertainty of TPS left at the whims of congress as it, “can facilitate labor
exploitation and block social mobility, with particular detriments to women and children.”78
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These academic works focus on the tension between official narratives on TPS addressing
protection needs created by gaps in the US asylum system and the lived experiences of recipients
in the U.S. These critiques have significant implications about the shortcomings of TPS, by
pointing to the ways in which the lack of a comprehensive immigrant integration program
contributes to further inequality for migrants.
Despite these valid critiques about the limitations of temporary protected status,
numerous scholars in American Studies assert that TPS is nevertheless filling a critical protection
gap embedded within the Refugee Convention. In Securing Protection for De Facto Refugees:
The Case of Central America’s Northern Triangle, Medrano advocated for securing protections
for de facto refugees. She asserts that protective status is denied to Central Americans migrants
because the threats facing the applicants are considered “unconventional violence,” which is not
covered by the definition of a refugee codified in the 1951 Convention. 79 Medrano maintains
that in the shift away from traditional armed conflict to violent non-state actors, migrants do not
qualify for refugee status because they do not face persecution at the hands of government
entities. Medrano’s findings emphasize that in the absence of effective protection at the
international level, the new realities of displacement demand further action at the federal level
with humanitarian programs like TPS.
Correspondingly, in Filling the Gap: Temporary Protected Status, Frelick and Kohnen
argue that TPS fills a gap in U.S. refugee law by administering temporary protection to de facto
refugees fleeing ‘ongoing armed conflict and environmental disaster.’80 The authors assert that
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caution must be taken to avoid making TPS a, “substitute for permanent asylum for those
refugees meeting the standard of a well-founded fear of persecution.” They present this concern
because every year, the United States sets a ceiling on the number of refugees they will admit in
the country. Unlike refugee admissions, “there is no limit to the number of persons already
present in the United States who may receive asylum if they are determined to have a wellfounded fear of persecution.”81 These findings have significant implications as they substantiate
the ways in which protections awarded by TPS status are expanding the de facto definition of a
refugee by acknowledging climate-induced migration and non-state violence as new trends in
forced displacement.

Analytical Framework
Despite the structural inadequacies of the TPS regime, the program is bringing about a
shift in international norms towards a wider definition of what constitutes a refugee. The 1951
Refugee Convention was drafted to address refugee problems stemming from World War II.
Since then, the modern security landscape has experienced diverse causes for migration
including violence driven by violent non-state actors. The number of asylum applications by
Central Americans is rising because Northern Triangle countries are experiencing record levels
of non-state violence. The Northern Triangle is one of the most dangerous regions in Latin
America with decades of civil war and political instability manifesting in chronic violence. El
Salvador was recently named the world’s most deadly country outside a war zone fueled by drug
related crime and gang warfare. It had 104 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants last year, for a
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murder toll of 6,657. By way of comparison, per 100,000 inhabitants, the United States'
homicide rate is about four.82 A study on the potential implications of the upsurge in crime found
that, “crime victimization in Latin America increases the probability that people have thought
about migrating with their families to the United States.83 These findings have significant
implications for our understanding of the root causes of these recent migration trends since
victimization by non-state actors promotes the propensity to emigrate and there are complex
interactions between politics and the environment.
In addition to non-state violence acting as a driver of migration, the “dry corridor” of
Central America is also particularly vulnerable to the issue of climate change and its impact on
food security, which is propelling migration from the Northern Triangle. Severe drought in the
Central American dry corridor is linked to climate change which has devastated agriculture. The
"dry corridor" of Central America, which includes parts of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador
and Nicaragua, has been hit with erratic weather patterns. In Honduras, a dry corridor country,
crops were lost and 2 million people are now facing hunger.84 In addition to crime and violence,
climate change emerged as a new push factor driving Central American migrants to risk
starvation or leave their countries of origin.
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The Dry Corridor85
Because of these new persecuting agents, there has been a shift in refugee law as we see
migrants increasingly seeking refuge from persecution not emanating from the state. Because
refugee protection is contingent upon persecution at the hands of government agents due to
membership in a Particular Social Group (PSG), today’s Central American refugees fleeing nonstate violence and climate pressures do not qualify for refugee status. Under the current
international refugee protection system, de facto refugees are not eligible for international
protection when they seek assistance from a foreign government despite their vulnerability. 86 In
addressing the legal gaps in protection, alternative forms of protection for migrants who do not
meet the qualifications for refugee status have expanded the de facto definition of a refugee and
acknowledged the nexus between climate change, conflict, and displacement. Critiques aimed at
the existing refugee order reflect the advantage of regional based solutions like Temporary
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Protected Status in filling the protection gap left by the convention and the insufficiencies of the
international refugee system.
Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) pointed out that there is nothing so permanent in US
immigration law as a temporary status.87 Though TPS was intended to be used for temporary,
short-term situations, it has become the most permanent reprieve from removal available to
migrants. Furthermore, by protecting foreign nationals facing environmental disasters and nonstate violence that make it unsafe to return to their country of origin, it is filling critical gaps that
exist in the current domestic and international refugee protection regime. Despite this, TPS has
its limitations and migrants with this “liminal legality” do not enjoy the same security granted to
refugees. In the subsequent chapters I will examine two selected natural disasters that drove TPS
designations for Central American countries: the January 2001 El Salvador earthquake and
Hurricane Mitch. This research allows me to explore the question: does TPS expand the de facto
definition of a refugee and what are the consequences of this ad hoc system? U.S. law draws a
stark division between refugees facing persecution at the hands of the state and other displaced
migrants. Despite this division, the changing climate and violent non-state actors have arisen as
new threats driving international migration. It is imperative that the international refugee system
secure protections for de facto refugees in the Northern Triangle. For Central American foreign
nationals seeking protection, the source of the threat doesn’t matter as they are forced to flee for
their lives.

87

Bill Frelick. "What's Wrong with Temporary Protected Status and How to Fix It." 26 Feb. 2020,
https://cmsny.org/publications/tps-frelick-022820/. Accessed 20 Sep. 2020.

Calcano 34

Chapter 2: El Salvador 2001 Earthquake
On January 13, 2001 a devastating earthquake rocked El Salvador leaving Temporary
Protected Status designation to fill the refugee legal protection gap for migrants displaced by
environmental disasters. Though TPS fills a critical gap in the refugee protection regime, it does
so by employing climate and environmental factors as a catch-all protection apparatus. First, I
will recount the destruction brought on by the January 2001 El Salvador earthquake then move to
the way that disaster was discussed by the relevant actors and agencies in the U.S. Second, I will
detail the three primary steps of the TPS decision process and describe the approach DHS took to
inform the Secretary of Homeland Security’s TPS reviews. I will explain how TPS represents an
extension of the responsibility to protect migrants fleeing climate catastrophe, how it seeks to
address the economic impact of natural disasters, and how it was granted to provide Salvadorans
environmental migrants with “refuge” and “safety.” By detailing El Salvador’s designation
process for temporary protected status, I will show how these discussions mirror the same
justifications given to refugees with the admission of environmental disasters as a persecuting
agent.
The magnitude 7.6 quake later estimated to be 7.7 or 7.9 was centered in the ocean 65
miles away from the capital of San Salvador. The earthquake was felt from Mexico City in the
north to Colombia in the south. El Salvador's National Emergency Committee (COEN) reported
“681 deaths, 2,615 injuries, 45,842 people displaced, 24,759 houses destroyed, and 90,292
houses damaged.”88 Following the initial destruction, 3,000 subsequent aftershocks struck the
region causing more than $1 billion in damage and leaving tens of thousands of people homeless
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and in need of assistance.89 Access to clean water and sanitation for survivors was also limited
after 75% of potable water systems were damaged or destroyed in the immediate aftermath of the
quake.90 Poor sanitation fueled disease fears in the aftermath of the El Salvador quake as
desperate survivors began to scavenge debris piles containing severed human limbs in a
desperate search for items they could pawn to purchase food and other necessary goods. The
worst damage and loss of life took place in Santa Tecla and Comasagua where large mudslides
engulfed hundreds of homes.91
Man-accelerated environmental factors were found to have contributed to the high level
of seismic risk in El Salvador that culminated in the 2001 Earthquake.92 A study on the El
Salvador earthquakes of January and February 2001 found that, “the earthquakes have clearly
demonstrated trends of increasing seismic risk in El Salvador due to rapid population expansion
in areas of high shaking and landslide hazard, exacerbated by deforestation and uncontrolled
urbanization.” El Salvador’s vulnerability to extreme climatic events has resulted in the country
experiencing, on average, one destructive earthquake per decade during the last hundred years. In
the aftermath of the 2001 earthquake, it became increasingly evident that landslides wreaked
significant damage as is often the case in El Salvador’s seismic history. Javier E. Baez and
Indhira V. Santos’s report On Shaky Ground: The Effects of Earthquakes on Household Income
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and Poverty found that the vulnerability of El Salvador to natural hazards is explained by several
factors.
First and foremost, “the country has the highest population density among all the
countries in Central America. Second, several major population settlements are located
along six active volcanoes and in areas highly exposed to geological hazards such as the
earthquake-prone Ring of Fire. In fact, El Salvador has been struck by a major quake, on
average, once every ten years during the last century. Third, the country is located in the
sub-tropical hurricane area and, thus, is subjected to both Atlantic and Pacific storms. The
floods triggered by these storms are at times followed by extended dry periods with
significantly below average precipitation.”93
The confluence of rapid urbanization and a natural disaster had adverse effects on El Salvador’s
vulnerable populations and disastrous economic consequences which were estimated to take
years to repair.
In turn, El Salvador was granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) due to the economic
disruptions and damage caused by the earthquakes that devastated the country in January and
February 2001. The Department of Homeland Security’s designation of countries for Temporary
Protected Status (TPS) includes three main steps. Initially, the Secretary of Homeland Security
reviews a country for TPS designation based on a request from a foreign government or other
factors. Next, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) works alongside the
Department of State (State) to put together country condition reports that influence the
Secretary’s decision. In the last step, the secretary decides whether to initially designate a

93

Javier E Baez, and Indhira V Santos. “On Shaky Ground: The Effects of Earthquakes on Household Income and
Poverty.” United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean,
December 2008, 38.

Calcano 37

country for TPS and if the country conditions warrant an extension or termination every 18
months.94
The first step of El Salvador’s TPS designation process displays how Temporary
Protected Status represents an extension of the “responsibility to protect” Salvadoran migrants
fleeing a climate catastrophe. A United States Government Accountability Office Temporary
Protected Status Report On Steps Taken to Inform and Communicate Secretary of Homeland
Security’s Decisions explained that, “first, the Secretary of Homeland Security may initiate a
review of a country for TPS designation in response to various triggering factors, such as a
request from a foreign government, on the basis of one or more statutory conditions.”95 The
destruction and economic hardships brought on by the January and February 2001 earthquakes
drove then-President Flores’ administration to request immigration protection that prevents
undocumented Salvadorans from being detained or deported from the United States. In the days
following the earthquake, the Minister of Foreign Relations, María Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila,
sent a letter soliciting Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for thousands of undocumented
Salvadorans in the United States since the tragedy. Ávila addressed the letter to Bill Clinton’s
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and noted that the designation of Temporary Protected
States would extend immigrant protection for Salvadorans impacted by climate catastrophes
who did not previously benefit from protections. These protections were previously awarded to
other Central Americans asylum seekers fleeing political instability and violence during the
1980s under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act.96
94

United States Government Accountability Office, "Temporary Protected StatusSteps Taken to Inform and
Communicate Secretary of Homeland Security’s Decisions."April, 2020.
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/705691.pdf.
95
United States Government Accountability Office, "Temporary Protected StatusSteps Taken to Inform and
Communicate Secretary of Homeland Security’s Decisions."
96
La Prensa Gráfica. “Flores gestionó TPS para 280,000 salvadoreños.” Accessed May 6, 2021.
https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Flores-gestiono-TPS-para-280000-salvadorenos-20160202-0023.html.

Calcano 38

Initially, the outbreak of civil war in El Salvador drove migration to the United States and
by the 1980s, there were 500,000 to 800,000 Salvadorans seeking asylum in the country. Though
Salvadorans fleeing political violence during the 1980s met the eligibility to be qualified as
as asylum seekers under US law, just 2 percent of Salvadoran asylum applications filed amid the
civil war were approved.97 The US government was unwilling to recognize Salvadoran migrants
as political refugees because of the country’s involvement in the civil wars of Central America,
particularly the Salvadoran conflict. Over the course of the Salvadoran civil war the United
States “sent more than $4.5 billion in aid to El Salvador, trained many Salvadoran soldiers on
U.S. soil in counter-insurgency tactics and torture techniques.”98 All in all, U.S. military
intervention played a significant role in the political instability that marked the Central American
crisis and gave rise to the Salvadoran Civil War.
The U.S. government’s reluctance to extend protection to Salvadoran asylum seekers
faced opposition on the principle of the responsibility to protect. The United States’ failure to
extend protection to Salvadorans as political refugees gave rise to legal suits such as American
Baptist Churches v. Thornburg of 1991 which mandated the reevaluation of asylum petitions
made by Salvadorans and Guatemalans fleeing political persecution in the 1980s.99 Additionally,
Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) advocated to obtain safe haven for Salvadorans and expressed
that the United States had a humanitarian responsibility towards those who fled civil war in El
Salvador because of the United States’ involvement in the conflict. In support of TPS, he stated,
“I do not believe that we should return these individuals to a country immersed in a civil war in
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which we are actively involved.”100 Though the government initially denied the asylum claims of
Salvadoran migrants seeking refuge in the United States and strategically identified them as
economic migrants, the responsibility to protect and non-refoulement arose as principles that
supported the protection of Salvadoran migrants against armed conflicts with the mechanism of
TPS.101
In turn, the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) was
enacted in 1997 and provided eligibility for Legal Permanent Resident status to Salvadoran TPS
recipients, other Central Americans and nationals of the former Soviet bloc.102 The NACARA
Act was passed in 1997 on the heels of political instability and violence that drove Central
America migration to the United States in the 1980s.103 This law granted immigration benefits to
Nicaraguans and Cubans who entered US territory before December 1, 1995. It was intended to
protect migrants from countries experiencing civil war and resulted in the cancellation of
removal of Salvadoran nationals in the United States. This act set a precedent for protections
extended to immigrant groups on the grounds of the responsibility to protect.
A few years later after the January and February 2001 earthquake, President Bush
released a statement on relief and reconstruction assistance for El Salvador where he relayed the
Attorney General's decision to grant temporary relief from deportation that allowed Salvadorans
to remain in the United States, also premised upon the responsibility to protect and nonrefoulement. President Bush expressed that this designation was approved with the objective of
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allowing, “migrants to continue to work here and to remit some of their wages back home to
support El Salvador's recovery efforts. The recent earthquake in Washington State brings home
to the citizens of our nation how natural disasters can strike any of us. And it reminds us of our
obligation to reach out to help those in other nations struggling in the wake of disaster to rebuild
their homes and lives.”104 President Bush’s statement on the designation of TPS for Salvadorans
fleeing environmental degradation represents an extension of the responsibility to protect
migrants fleeing climate catastrophe.
There are ideological and political reasons for why the Bush administration employed
ecological and environmental disasters as a catch-all protection category under Temporary
Protected Status following the 2001 El Salvador Earthquakes. Prior to the 2001 Earthquake,
there had been ongoing advocacy for TPS for Salvadorans, but the Bush administration was
reluctant to redesignate Salvadorans for TPS for political reasons. When the earthquake hit,
Salvadoran President Francisco Flores made the request for Temporary Protected Status based on
natural disaster destruction in the country and the George W. Bush administration was receptive
to extending it because it was considered an apolitical act. At the time, there were pressures for
the left calling for TPS for Salvadorans and pressures for the right pushing back and claiming
these were economic migrants, not refugees. The Bush administration saw the natural disaster
and call from Flores as an opportunity, so the extension of TPS perceived as a form of disaster
management. As the director of Human Rights Watch's Refugee and Migrant Rights Division,
Bill Frelick “monitors, investigates, and documents human rights abuses against refugees,
asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons, and advocates for the rights and humanitarian
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needs of all categories of forcibly displaced persons around the world.”105 In an interview with
him, he affirms that had there not been a natural disaster, TPS for Salvadorans would not have
happened.106
A central pillar of the international refugee regime in the responsibility to protect and the
legal principle of non-refoulement. Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the States of
Refugees focuses on the prohibition of expulsion or return (non-refoulement) and notes that, “no
Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”107 By
providing a safe haven for Salvadoran foreign nationals facing environmental emergencies that
make it unsafe to return to their country of origin, TPS extends the principle of non-refoulement
to include climate catastrophes as a serious threat to life or freedom.
In The Besieged US Refugee Protection System: Why Temporary Protected Status
Matters Donald Kerwin affirms that the Temporary Protected Status program is a pillar of the
US refugee protection system because it, “honors, however imperfectly, the well-established
responsibility of states to offer safe haven to persons who would be endangered if returned to
their home countries.”108 Humanitarian programs have historically protected Salvadoran
migrants against armed conflicts, and by extending TPS to Salvadoran migrants following the
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January and February 2001 earthquakes, it also protects against other destabilizing factors, such
as economic or natural disasters, which make it difficult or unsafe for their nationals to be
deported.109
TPS designation decisions take economic indicators into account which shows how the
Temporary Protected Status regime employs the environment as a catch-all category to fill the
refugee legal protection gap for migrants displaced by environmental disasters and goes a step
further by acknowledging how poverty is a major driver of people's vulnerability to natural
disasters. In the second step of the TPS decision process, “U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS)—which manages and coordinates the TPS review process for DHS—and the
Department of State (State) compile country conditions reports and recommendations to inform
the Secretary’s decision.”110 The El Salvador USCIS country condition report for TPS
designation included information about economic indicators such as gross domestic product and
unemployment statistics for the coffee industry. This step in the TPS designation process
acknowledges that ongoing insecurity is exacerbated by the lack of economic opportunity and
unemployment that arises from recurrent natural disasters. This phenomenon has contributed to
continual flows of migrants from Central American countries, particularly the destructive
consequences of the 2001 El Salvador quakes on agricultural exports.
The 2001 earthquakes had devastating consequences on El Salvador’s staggeringly high
poverty rate. Prior to the natural disaster, El Salvador experienced persistent low levels of growth
and poverty reduction compared to other developing nations. This degree of poverty was
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compounded by the fact that the country was reeling from the effects of a civil war that lasted
twelve years and brought on a 2.2 percent annual decline in the economy between 1979 and
1989.111 Just as El Salvador was establishing a transition to peace and a functional democracy,
the quake dealt a deadly blow to the country’s economy. At the onset of the natural disaster, a
report concluded that El Salvador "presents one of the world's greatest income distribution
inequalities," because "the richest 20 percent of society gets an average 18 times more than the
poorest 20 percent.”112 Though the country has recently registered a moderate poverty reduction
rate, El Salvador had one of the highest poverty rates in the world with 46.20% of the population
living under total poverty at the time of the quakes.113
The USCIS report explicitly identified the destruction of El Salvador's coffee industry
and the subsequent unemployment and poverty it brought as the most significant impacts of the
2001 earthquake. The country’s economy has long been dependent on agriculture, particularly
indigo, a blue dye which topped its exports for centuries. Indigo exports subsided in favor of
coffee in the 1880’s, making El Salvador the third-largest coffee producer one century later.114
During the 1980s, coffee continued to be one of the most important products for the Salvadoran
economy since it was a leading export crop and represented 95% of the nation's GDP.115 This
demonstrates how coffee production played an integral part in El Salvador’s economic
development and stability as a nation. Despite the ways in which coffee production long fueled
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the Salvadoran economy, this lucrative industry faced decline in the face of the earthquakes of
2001 in which El Salvador’s coffee industry’s mills and lands suffered extensive damage.
Following the quakes, the USCIS report found that, “coffee industry officials say that up
to 60 percent of coffee cultivating lands have been abandoned due to international price collapse,
leaving an estimated 50,000 peasant laborers without work.”116 All in all, economic losses from
the earthquakes were reported to be as high as $2.6 billion, almost 15 percent of the gross
domestic product of $18 billion. According to the UN Development Program, “51 percent of the
population now lives below the poverty line, a proportion nearly four percentage points higher
than in 1999 considered due to the quakes. Additionally, more than 200 Salvadorans are reported
to be emigrating every day due to poverty.”117 In El Salvador, migrants fled their homes because
of the combined effects of the 2001 earthquakes and poverty. A report on Climate Change,
Natural Disasters and Migration: An Empirical Analysis in Developing Countries articulated
that this can be explained by the fact that “the economy of many developing countries is
essentially based on agriculture and primary goods which are one of the main sectors directly
touched by climate change and natural disasters.”118 Taking a closer look at El Salvador and the
way in which the earthquakes wreaked havoc on the Salvadoran coffee industry and increased
poverty is significant in understanding the ways TPS has been employed to address the economic
factors that drive environmental migrants.
The USCIS report openly discussed that Salvadorans facing economic hardships because
of environmental hazards could not qualify for refugee status due to the narrow definition of

116

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “El Salvador: Information on Recovery and Reconstruction
since the Earthquakes of 2001.” Refworld, May 21, 2002. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dec96354.html.
117
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “El Salvador: Information on Recovery and Reconstruction
since the Earthquakes of 2001.”
118
Alassane Drabo and Linguère Mously Mbaye. “Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Migration: An Empirical
Analysis in Developing Countries.” Institute of Labor Economics, August 2011, http://ftp.iza.org/dp5927.pdf.

Calcano 45

refugees. The 2001 earthquake’s detrimental effects on El Salvador’s economy informed the
USCIS’s description of “current conditions” that would influence the country’s hardship
considerations. The report indicated that their findings on the environmental and economic
factors driving migration following the 2001 earthquake “is not, and does not purport to be,
conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status.”119 In spite of this, the report
was utilized to support El Salvador’s designation for Temporary Protected Status as an
alternative to protect migrants facing both environmental and economic degradation. Refugee
status is limited to an individual who faces “fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group.”120 The report
highlights how the traditional definition of a refugee does not protect against the economic
factors that drive environmental migrants, while TPS uses the environment as a catch-all for
wide-ranging drivers of migration, including economic driving factors. In Figure 1, it is evident
the climate and environment are cited every time TPS has been extended or redesignated for El
Salvador. All the while, the overall economic vitality of the country and the country’s
infrastructure are the primary country conditions this designation is addressing under the guise of
an environmental designation.

Figure 1
Country Conditions Factors Cited by the U.S. Government in TPS Designation and Extensions
for El Salvador
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Country Conditions Factors Cited by the U.S. Government in TPS Designation and Extensions
for El Salvador
Climate and Environment
● 2001 Earthquake (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015,
2016, 2018)
● Drought (2002, 2015, 2016, 2017)
● Deforestation ()
● Erosion ()
● Floods/flood concerns (2006, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2016)
● Forest fire concerns ()
● Landslides or mudslides/landslide concerns (2006, 2015)
● Pollution of water sources (2012, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, )
● Subsequent natural disasters
○ 2005 Tropical Storm Stan (2010, 2012, 2015)
○ 2005 Santa Ana Volcano Eruption (2006, 2010)
○ 2006 Earthquakes (2010, 2015)
○ Tropical depression 12-E (2013, 2015)
○ Tropical storms and hurricanes (2010, 2012, 2015, 2016)
● Torrential/heavy rains (2015, 2016)
● Coffee rust epidemic (2015, 2016)
Economy
● Economic losses/decreased economic activity/economic stress (2012, 2012, 2013,
2015, 2016, 2018)
○ Crop failures/damage to crops (2010, 2015)
○ Industrial and tourist sectors ()
○ Shrimp industry ()
● Long-term development challenges (2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2016,
2017)
● Poverty (2015, 2016)
● Reliance on outside/international assistance (2006, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2018)
● Unemployment/underemployment (2002, 2010, 2016, 2018)
○ Youth unemployment ()
○ Coffee industry ()
○ Agricultural sector layoffs ()
Infrastructure
● Homes damaged or destroyed/housing needs (2001, 2002, 2003, 2010, 2012, 2013,
2015, 2016, 2018)
● Schools damaged or destroyed/educational system incapacity (2001, 2002, 2003, 2005,
2012, 2013, 2015, 2018)
● Hospitals/health centers damaged or destroyed (2002, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010,
2012, 2013, 2015, 2018)
● Sanitation/sewage/water system damage (2012, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018)
● Impact to road network/bridges (2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015,
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2018)
● Access to electricity (2012, 2016)
● Vulnerability to further damage by adverse climatic conditions (2017)
Public Health
● Deaths/fatalities (2002, 2010)
● Food/water insecurity (2002, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018)
● Malnutrition (2002, 2016)
● Health system incapacity (2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013,
2015, 2016)
● Drought-related impacts on hygiene ()
● Disease ()
● Dengue and chikungunya in 2014 and 2015 (2016)
Safety and Security
● Population displacement (2001, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015)
● Homelessness/shelter housing (2005, 2016)
● Security concerns/potential for escalating violence (2016)
Governance
● Political crisis ()
121
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Since TPS protects migrants facing the economic ramifications of an environmental
disaster, it acknowledges that poverty aggregates the suffering that natural disasters cause. In
turn, the designation of temporary protected status sought to fill a gap in the increasingly blurred
line between refugees and environmentally induced economic migrants in international refugee
law. In their analysis of the relationship between climate change and migration, Alassane Drabo
and Linguère Mously Mbaye studied the effect of natural disasters caused by climate change on
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migration rates and found that, “they suffer a “double penalty” because, in the current context,
less-developed countries may be trapped in a vicious circle: their poverty makes them more
vulnerable in the face of climate change and due to their poverty, climate change will have
serious consequences on health, income and growth prospects and will trigger their poverty and
vulnerability.”122 Climate change makes existing vulnerabilities that drive migration more
urgent in economically volatile developing countries. In the case of the 2001 earthquakes,
migration from El Salvador responded to economic shocks. In Transiciones e Incertidumbres:
Migration from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, Obinna recounts how Salvadoran and
other Central American migrants fleeing political persecution, gang violence, poverty and natural
disasters, migrants are often desperate for social and economic stability. In El Salvador and other
Central American countries, “unemployment, political instabilities, natural disasters like
Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and a series of earthquakes in 2001, migration swiftly continued
throughout the 2000s.”123 This affirms that socio economic factors cannot be separated from
other factors influencing migration and population movements in the case of El Salvador. As
more frequent disasters are high among the impacts of climate change, environmental disasters
are emerging as a driver of migration that complicates existing vulnerabilities.
With the exception of the Trump administration, El Salvador has been granted extensions
of TPS on the premise that non state violence makes it difficult or unsafe for Salvadoran
nationals to return, which is evidence that this status was granted to provide Salvadorans
environmental migrants with “refuge” and “safety.” In the third step of the TPS designation
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process, “the Secretary of Homeland Security exercises in deciding whether to initially designate
a country for TPS. For an existing designation, the Secretary determines whether country
conditions warrant an extension or termination of TPS.”124 In El Salvador’s case, the country
received TPS extensions for two decades due to ongoing reconstruction of infrastructure and
housing damaged by the earthquakes. In a 2016 Department of Homeland Security report, it was
reported that the Secretary was extending the TPS designation for El Salvador through March 9,
2018. Temporary Protected Status extensions are premised upon the assertion that conditions
supporting the original designation continue to exist. These conditions are essentially based on
economic growth with GDP, fiscal policy and unemployment rates serving as indicators of
natural disaster recovery. In 2016, the secretary determined that an 18-month extension was
warranted because the conditions supporting El Salvador’s 2001 designation for TPS persist as
violence serves as an obstacle to development. The secretary reported that:
“Increasing violence and insecurity is also a major constraint to economic growth.
According to a study released in April 2016 by El Salvador’s Central Bank and the
United Nations Development Program, Salvadoran citizens paid $756 million in extortion
payments to gangs in 2014, representing about three percent of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). The study estimates the total cost of violence, including the amount households
spend on extra security and the lost income from people deterred from working, is nearly
16 percent of GDP, the highest level in Central America. Hampered by limited financial
resources, the government continues to struggle to respond adequately to increasing
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levels of crime, and there is little confidence the security situation will improve in the
short term.”125
The Secretary can designate a country for TPS on the grounds of current gangand state-related
violence under the “temporary extraordinary conditions” or “armed conflict” provisions. In El
Salvador’s 2016 extension, the secretary determined that the conditions supporting the March 9,
2001 designation of El Salvador for TPS continue to be met. The environmental conditions
impeding El Salvador’s economic growth were shown to be aggravated by non-state violence
that continues to plague the country.
El Salvador has become known as the western hemisphere’s murder capital after a truce
between country’s two most powerful street gangs, Mara Salvatrucha and the 18th Street gang,
deteriorated in 2014. Consequently, the death toll has spiked to the highest levels since the
country's civil war ended in 1992.126 The surge in gang violence is being used to explain why
new security concerns continue to make it unsafe for its citizens to return. As crimes such as
extortion and armed robbery have become commonplace in the country, surveys carried out by
the UN concluded that people’s sense of insecurity had risen after briefly falling in the aftermath
of the gang truce.127 The report highlights the difficulty of improving security and economic
recovery in El Salvador where there are 60,000 active gang members in a country with a
population of just 6.5 million people.128
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In addition to fueling non-state violence that has forced thousands of Salvadorans to flee,
powerful street gangs have also worsened conditions that make it unsafe for individuals to be
deported back to El Salvador. A Guardian investigation revealed that the US government is
deporting undocumented immigrants back to Central America deaths. Though their investigation
found three separate cases of Honduran men murdered following their deportations, a local
newspaper report identified 83 US deportees who were murdered following their deportations to
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras since January 2014.129 This signifies how Temporary
Protected Status functions as a form of de facto amnesty by highlighting the increased presence
of street gangs as a condition that makes El Salvador unable to handle the safe return of its
citizens.
The economic impact of violence and its linkages to poverty and inequality presents a
serious development constraint in Latin America as a whole. The World Health Organization
2002 World report on violence and health studied the magnitude and economic impact of
violence in six Latin American countries including El Salvador. The studies carried out by the
Inter-American Development Bank analyzed expenditures resulting from violence for health care
services, law enforcement and judicial services and intangible losses and losses from the transfer
of assets. All in all, the cost of health care expenditures arising from violence totaled at 1.9% of
the GDP in El Salvador.130 Non-state violence in El Salvador resulted in costs being directed
towards government expenditures and prevention measures that present a significant portion of
the country’s GDP.
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In Violence as an Obstacle to Development Morrison and Buvinic articulated the
phenomenon of violence as an impediment to economic development by showcasing how, “from
a macroeconomic point of view, violence reduces foreign and domestic investment as well as
domestic savings, thus hindering prospects for long term growth.”131 The report calculated the
economic costs of social violence in El Salvador in losses in health, material losses, intangible
losses, and losses from transfers of assets. Though Salvaron migrants have resided in the United
States for upwards to two decades, Temporary Protected Status is intended to be a humanitarian
framework that largely addresses the temporary factors that make it unsafe for an individual to
be to their country of origin, with economic development serving as a central indicator of natural
disaster recovery. Factoring El Salvador’s economic fragility, because of violence, into the
consideration for extending TPS shows how the status granted Salvadorans environmental
migrants with “refuge” and “safety.”
TPS protects people who would face extreme hardship if forced to return to their
countries of origin devastated by armed conflict or natural disasters. The 1951 Refugee
Convention defines a refugee as, “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country
of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”132 On the other hand,
Temporary protected status fills critical gaps in the refugee protection regime by extending
protections to migrants fleeing environmental disasters and armed violence. TPS designation for
El Salvador was first granted after the January 2001 Earthquake struck the country with the

131

Mayra Buvinic. “Violence as an Obstacle to Development.” Inter-American Development Bank, June 1999.
https://publications.iadb.org/en/publication/11628/violence-obstacle-development.
132
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
UN Refugee Agency, 1951. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relatingstatus-refugees.html.

Calcano 54

hopes of providing temporary protection to Salvadoran nationals. Despite this, some
beneficiaries of the program have now resided in the United States for decades and put down
roots in this country. El Salvador’s TPS designation process alludes to how the program has been
employed as an ad hoc temporary fix to the broken global refugee regime. The disaster’s
discussion by relevant actors and agencies in the U.S. mirror the same justifications given to
refugees. In their discussion, TPS was granted as an extension of the responsibility to protect
migrants fleeing climate catastrophe, it sought to address the economic repercussions of a natural
disaster and it was advocated that TPS be granted to provide recipients with “refuge” and
“safety.” Though TPS recipients face a life of liminal legality, El Salvador’s TPS designation is a
case study of how national humanitarian protection frameworks in the United States have
attempted to fill gaps in international protection as the changing climate and violent non-state
actors have arisen as new threats driving international migration.

Chapter 3: Honduras and Nicaragua Hurricane Mitch
Over a two-week period from 22 October to 2 November, what began as a tropical wave
off the coast of West Africa became Hurricane Mitch, the second-deadliest Atlantic hurricane
ever recorded.133 More than 11,000 people died as a result of the hurricane in 1998,
approximately 6,500 dead with 11,000 missing, presumed dead in Honduras and 3,800 dead with
7,000 missing, presumed dead in Nicaragua. 134 Hurricane Mitch struck when Central America
was coming off the heels of El Niño 1997-1998, regarded as one of the most powerful el Niño’s
in which the change in weather patterns brought about unprecedented drought in parts of Central
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America (Honduras and Guatemala). 135 As it made landfall in Central America, the storm grew
to a Category 5 hurricane - the highest level on the Saffir Simpson Scale. The system reached
peak intensity on 26 October, in which the storm developed to produce sustained winds of about
290 km/h (180 mph) and a low pressure of 905 mb, the lowest recorded pressure for any October
hurricane on record in the Atlantic.136 Mitch’s slow movement resulted in torrential rain and
mudslides, predominantly in Honduras and Nicaragua.137 The storm changed the landscape of
Central America forever, leaving parts of the two countries severely altered and uninhabitable
following widespread flooding.
In this chapter, I explore if and how TPS was used to fill a critical gap in the refugee
protection regime, and how the TPS process relates to Honduras and Nicaragua following
Hurricane Mitch. First, I will outline the impact of Hurricane Mitch on both Honduras and
Nicaragua and detail how certain US neoliberal policies made populations vulnerable to this
natural disaster. I will then proceed to detail how the first step of the TPS designation process for
environmental disasters helps insulate the US, Honduras and Nicaragua from criticism since
foreign governments must request that foreign nationals not be returned to their country of
origin, inciting the US responsibility to protect. The United States identified the climate and
environment as the primary conditions for TPS designation because the term natural disasters
is relatively politically neutral and absolves the U.S., Honduras and Nicaraguan governments
from addressing responsibility for more systemic embedded issues. Though my project cannot
fully explore the complex relationship between local politics and natural disasters, I will
135
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highlight how local actors also have an incentive for employing the environment as a catch-all
tool for chronic problems because they are also culpable for insecurity in the region. In effect,
the environmental disaster basis for TPS designation allows the United States and local actors to
avoid addressing more systemic issues. Lastly, I will detail how for subsequent extensions of
Temporary Protected Status, economic factors emerged as the primary justification for extending
the designation while employing the environmental disaster as the justification for prolonged
protection.
Though Hurricane Mitch wreaked havoc on a number of Central American countries,
Honduras received the brunt of the storm’s catastrophic damage. Torrential rainfall from the
hurricane brought widespread flooding which triggered landslides through the country,
predominantly in the cities of Tegucigalpa and Comayaguela. In Tegucigalpa, a landslide that
was approximately six million cubic meters in volume resulted in extensive damage that
obliterated the rural community of Colonia Soto and buried many alive.138 The slow movement
of the storm also led to massive rains that washed soil into rivers and blocked them. The
landslide posed a health hazard to the city as it dammed the Río Choluteca and created a
reservoir of untreated sewage-filled water in which “corpses floated by.”139
Hurricane Mitch caused extensive damage to critical infrastructure as the unprecedented
flooding resulted in significant destruction to private property, including homes and businesses.
When the force of the hurricane struck residential structures, homes were ripped apart by the
storm's powerful winds leaving over 20% of Honduras’s population homeless.140 The day after
138
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Hurricane Mitch made landfall, Honduras was a different country as the storm destroyed many
bridges and roads. With power and communications down across most of the country, buildings
and bridges destroyed, affected communities remained isolated and unable to access emergency
services. It was reported that the magnitude of the damage was so great that it is said that
existing road maps were rendered useless as 50% to 60% of the roads and bridges sustained
some type of damage. 141
All 18 departments across the country were damaged by severe floods as well as
hundreds of millions of dollars of damage to the agricultural sector. Agriculture suffered
tremendous damage, with losses in the sector reaching $1.7 billion (1998 USD) due to extensive
crop damage.142 Flooding from Mitch also destroyed 70% of the agricultural sector in Honduras,
including 80% of bananas, 60% of sugar cane, and 58% of the corn crops.143 Across the country,
Mitch’s prolonged barrage took out entire plantations which culminated in immediate food
shortages and the destruction of large exports such as bananas, coffee and shrimp which are
responsible for half the country's annual export revenue of $3 billion.”144 The economy of
Honduras is based mostly on agriculture, which accounted for 17% of the gross domestic product
at the time of the earthquake.145 The hurricane had catastrophic effects which threw an
agriculturally dependent economy into a Mitch-induced recession (1.9%) in 1999.
The President of Honduras, Carlos Flores, declared a state of emergency in the aftermath
of Hurricane Mitch and alluded to how damage caused by the hurricane might permanently set
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the nation’s economy back. The total cost of the hurricane was estimated to exceed $5 billion as
two million people out of the country’s population of six million were significantly impacted.146
In an emotional televised address he told the nation that, “the history of Honduras was now seen
in terms of 'pre- and post- Mitch.' In 72 hours, the hurricane had destroyed 50 years of
development.”147 What was described as the western hemisphere’s worst-ever disaster had
detrimental impacts on Honduras’ already stagnant economy, which influenced the economic
motivations behind the country’s TPS designation.
At the onset of the hurricane, Honduras was already the fourth-poorest country in Latin
America, making it particularly vulnerable to the risk of natural disasters.148 Hardest hit were
more marginalized populations of the rural hillside which were particularly exposed to the
effects of natural hazards. In Hurricane Mitch and Honduras: An illustration of population
vulnerability William C. Smith documents that 20 years of neoliberal policies forced small
subsistence farmers to the hillside, resulting in massive deforestation that compounded the
impacts of Hurricane Mitch’s unprecedented rainfall.
This disproportionately impacted poor rural communities that were highly exposed and
vulnerable to the effects of Hurricane Mitch when widespread flooding washed away a large area
of topsoil and generated mudslides that decimated hillside farms. Smith views international
financial institutions as agents of neoliberalism and recounts that institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) provided financing to support development and change in Honduras
146
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during the 1980s. Small subsistence farmers were displaced and pushed to the mountain side as
large private farmers staked a claim to the land to grow bananas, coffee, and melon. This
displacement came because of development programs which provided financing and services on
the condition that large private farmers promoted export crops.
There were grave economic consequences to these development programs as their
implementation contributed to Honduras’ descent into increasing economic disparity. The
situation was compounded by the fact that these policies transferred the tax burden to the poor
that were pushed out of their communities. After international financial institutions and the U.S.
government aggressively promoted neoliberal policies in Honduras, the resulting shift in
production instituted in Honduras contributed to difficulties for poor rural communities burdened
by the repayment of external outstanding debt, which took precedence over conserving natural
resources.
The local government was also responsible for promoting neoliberal policies which
widened the wealth gap. One primary example of this is when the Honduran government
collaborated with the Inter-American Development Bank to “raise sales tax from 7% to 12% in
1998, while reducing the income tax paid by the wealthy by 10% from 35 to 25%-a fiscal policy
that shifted the tax burden to the middle and lower classes.”149 This demonstrates how several
neoliberal practices widened disparities in the distribution of wealth and income between
wealthy and poor Hondurans set the stage for the disproportionate impacts poor rural
communities suffered in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. Additionally, President Rafael
Callejas was responsible for liberalizing trade and devaluing the country's currency in 1989.
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After his actions, corruption ran rampant and widened economic inequality as the wealthiest
segments of Honduras' economy managed to capture an ever-larger share of our nation's
economic growth as the vast majority of the nation saw little gains from international
investments. Smith elaborates on the connection between neoliberal policies and population
vulnerability to Hurricane Mitch:
The majority of the poor in Honduras are found in either of the marginal areas
surrounding urban centers or on the rural hillside. Following the movement to export
crops, small farmers were forced up on the hillsides resulting in massive deforestation-as
of 1993 at a rate of 10,000 hectares per year. The process of deforestation started in the
last half of the 20th century but intensified in the last 2 decades as large population
growth led to environmental degradation. Overgrowing and the overuse of pesticides, in
addition to the removal of trees, led to the loss of 3 million tons of topsoil during this
time span. Without anything to hold the topsoil in place the torrential rains of Hurricane
Mitch led to widespread mudslides. 150
This example illustrates how the consequences for natural disasters are not natural, in fact, they
are often a result of human actions or exacerbated by human actions, potentially
disproportionately impacting the vulnerable populations.
While damage was less severe than in Honduras, the passage of Hurricane Mitch through
Central America in October 1998 caused widespread and devastating flooding and land sliding in
Nicaragua. Due to its slow movement, Hurricane Mitch brought 75 inches of rainfall to rural
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parts of the country.151 There were more than 3,800 casualties in Nicaragua, the majority deaths
were caused by mudslides from the Casitas Volcano that engulfed 10 communities at its base.
This event amounted to a death toll of at least 2,000 as the damage extended past the surrounding
communities and into the town of Posoltega, 100 km north-west of the capital, Managua.152
Mayra del Socorro Gallo Aguirre’s reflected on Hurricane Mitch and its impact on Nicaragua
and recounted that, “entire families were carried away as bodies were strewn along the edges of
the landslide all the way down to the beach. The damage to infrastructure in the Chinandega
Department was severe, including various bridges destroyed on the main Leon-Chinandega
highway.153 The volcano was home to subsistence farmers settled there by the government who
were disproportionately impacted by the Casita volcano tragedy.
Mitch’s torrential storms had devastating impacts on Nicaragua's stagnant economy.
Through the country, Mitch caused catastrophic impacts across its path as it destroyed 23,900
homes along with 340 schools, and about 750,000 were left homeless as half a million houses
were damaged. 154 Few parts of the country were left unscathed by the indiscriminate destruction
brought by the hurricane as it was estimated that about 867,752 people were affected throughout
the country to one degree or another.155 Damage estimates for the country were placed at $1
billion as the floods and mudslides destroyed Nicaragua’s infrastructure.
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It was estimated that the damage by Mitch to Nicaraguan agricultural production will
take years to recover after Nicaragua lost around 5 percent of its GDP, with agriculture
especially affected following devastating damage to forests and natural resources. 156 Crops and
fisheries were also greatly affected as “sedimentation and animal carcasses mixed with sewage
and other materials contaminated the water in many places.”157 All across the country,
campesinos that farm crops or livestock to maintain themselves and their families were at risk of
starvation after the powerful storm that roared across Central America damaged thousands of
acres of cropland.
Similar to Smith, Cynthia Chavez Metoyer draws a connection between neoliberal
policies and Nicaragua’s economic crisis that Hurricane Mitch brought to the forefront in
Hurricane Mitch, Alemán, and Other Disasters for Women in Nicaragua. She claims that the
extent of Hurricane Mitch’s economic destruction in Nicaragua reveals that the country’s
stagnant economic landscape has been shaped by heavy external debts and structural adjustment
policies. As is the case in many Latin American countries, Metoyer claims that financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank influence
domestic policies by making loans that “underdeveloped” countries cannot repay. In turn, foreign
debt continues to be used as an instrument for subordinating the underdeveloped borrowers while
failing to carry out their goal of improving the standard of living, as evidenced by Nicaragua’s
impoverishment prior to and succeeding Hurricane Mitch. 158
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The nation’s suffering was compounded by the legacy of US interventions in Central
America as reports indicated that 75,000 anti-personnel landmines were loosened and scattered
across Nicaragua by the flooding brought on by Hurricane Mitch.159 These land mines are
remnants of the 1980s “Contra” wars during which President Reagan covertly funded an antiCommunist rebel group in Nicaragua. During this time period Central America experienced
military conflict and civil unrest as countries waged low intensity conflict wars entailing the use
of small-scale guerrilla tactics such as anti-personnel landmines. Because these landmines are
still found on the borders of Honduras and Nicaragua, the legacy of civil war left the region
littered with anti-personnel landmines unearthed by the storm.
Calling the contras the “moral equivalent of our founding fathers” the agents in the
National Security Council bypassed the Boland Amendment and utilized funds to provide
military assistance to the Contras that were attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government,
creating the infamous Iran-Contra scandal.160 Despite the long lasting impacts of US intervention
in Nicaragua, the United States has notably not acceded to the The Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction known as the Ottawa Convention, the international treaty banning the use of
landmines.161
Because both Honduras and Nicaragua requested that citizens not be returned, the United
States effectively bypassed the political implications of extending more permanent humanitarian
protections to immigrants by employing Temporary Protected Status as a form of disaster
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management and inciting the US responsibility to protect under crisis conditions. In the first step
of the TPS designation process, “the Secretary of Homeland Security may initiate a review of a
country for TPS designation in response to various triggering factors, such as a request from a
foreign government, on the basis of one or more statutory conditions.”162 Following the swath of
destruction and economic devastation Hurricane Mitch left in its path along Central America,
President Clinton hosted five Central American national leaders whose nations were impacted by
the storm, among them President Carlos Alberto Flores of Honduras and President Arnoldo
Aleman of Nicaragua. In remarks made at the Rose Garden, President Flores of Honduras
recounted how Central American leaders, “spoke about [their] profound concern, specially at this
point where thousands have been left homeless and without jobs, that there be not only
temporary measures, but a definite solution to the immigration status of the many Central
Americans now living and working in the United States.”163 President Flores’ administration
formally requested TPS status and his statement also reflected an attempt to secure more
permanent protection for foreign nationals unable to return to Honduras. He explained that the
government could not handle the return of its nationals because the pervasive impacts of
Hurricane Mitch have compounded existing social, political, and economic factors.
President Arnoldo Aleman of Nicaragua also expressed these sentiments when he
appealed to the White House to give tens of thousands of Nicaraguans a chance to remain in the
United States. Following the White House meeting, President Clinton announced that he would
visit the region early next year on the invitation of the five regional leaders he hosted. He began
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his first day of a four-day visit to Central America by paying tribute to the victims of Hurricane
Mitch in Nicaragua. President Clinton was joined by Nicaraguan president Arnoldo Aleman as
they laid wreaths and prayed for the victims from the Casita volcano engulfed ten villages,
burying 2000 people. Clinton’s first stop was at the only house left standing after the destruction
brought on by the mudslide down the side of Casita volcano, which “underscored that many
immigrants and TPS recipients have no home to return to.”164 In response, Clinton once again
reiterated that "we are brothers and we help each other” which reflects the continued
responsibility to protect as a justification for granting TPS status.165 The United States accepted
these requests and granted Temporary Protected Status to tens of thousands of Honduran and
Nicaraguan immigrants, whose countries were struck by Hurricane Mitch. As a result of this
designation, the US vowed to not deport unauthorized immigrants from these Central American
countries for at least 18 months.
In remarks made following his meeting with Central American leaders, President Bill
Clinton professed that, “over the past decade, Central Americans have transformed their
countries. Nations where freedom once was denied, where there was once fear and violence,
have now joined their neighbors as democracies in peace. Economic development has raised
many from poverty. Now nature has put that progress at risk. I say to the leaders here and to the
people of Central America, the United States will continue to do everything we can. Ayudaremos
a nuestros hermanos. We will help our brothers and sisters. It is the right thing to do.”166 This
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type of political rhetoric reflects the fact that it is easier to promote a policy in the immigration
sphere that purports to be a temporary, humanitarian response.
Bill Frelick affirms that there are political reasons why the United States would be
receptive to people fleeing conflicts that are not as overtly politically controversial. In an
interview with him, he reiterated that there are three potential basis for Temporary Protected
Status designation: ongoing armed conflict, an environmental disaster and other extraordinary
and temporary extreme circumstances.167 The environmental disaster criteria is different from the
other two criteria for protection insofar as it requires request from the country of origin. This
added requirement puts it in a different light because if a Central American designation is based
on generalized conditions of violence such as widespread human rights violations or armed
conflict, the United States is responsible for deeming these situations worthy of humanitarian
protections. Therefore, these designations have political implications domestically in terms of
how the United States positions itself in extending additional protections to immigrants.
An environmental disaster such as Hurricane Mitch is considered apolitical, an
emergency that requires emergency assistance as opposed to human agency. Effectively, what
makes the TPS designation process for environmental disasters more insulated from political
debate and opposition is that foreign governments request that the United States not send its
nationals back because they are unable to handle their safe return, which politically frames TPS
as a form of disaster management.
In the second step of the TPS decision process, “U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS)—which manages and coordinates the TPS review process for DHS—and the
Department of State (State) compile country conditions reports and recommendations to inform
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the Secretary’s decision.”168 In the TPS designation process lies the underlying question: what
are the sources of insecurity that would create harm for foreign nationals returning to their
country of origin? Though Hurricane Mitch may be the motivating factor for designating
protection, the factors driving more lasting insecurity are much more deeply rooted and complex.
Despite this reality, TPS is purposeful in claiming that an environmental disaster continues to be
the primary cause of insecurity in any given country. In the first TPS designations for both
Honduras and Nicaragua, the climate and environment were the only factors considered in
extending temporary immigration status to foreign nationals experiencing problems that make it
difficult or unsafe for their nationals to be deported there.
In the January 5, 1999 Designation of Honduras Under Temporary Protected Status,
country conditions informed the decision that, “Hurricane Mitch swept through Central America
causing severe flooding and associated damage in Honduras. Based on a thorough review by the
Departments of State and Justice, the Attorney General finds that, due to the environmental
disaster and substantial disruption of living conditions caused by Hurricane Mitch, Honduras is
unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return of Honduran nationals.” 169 In the January 5,
1999 Designation of Nicaragua Under Temporary Protected Status, country conditions informed
the decision that, “Hurricane Mitch swept through Central America causing severe flooding and
associated damage in Nicaragua. Based on a thorough review by the Departments of State and
Justice, the Attorney General finds that, due to the environmental disaster and substantial
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disruption of living conditions caused by Hurricane Mitch, Nicaragua is unable, temporarily, to
handle adequately the return of Nicaraguan nationals.” 170
The United States identified the climate and environment as the primary causes of
displacement with a political motive because environmental disasters are perceived as natural
which neutralizes US culpability and effectively places the responsibility for the failures of
development on natural causes. Despite this, natural hazards like Hurricane Mitch only have
disastrous consequences when communities on the ground are vulnerable. Though a hazard
cannot be prevented, vulnerability is the defining characteristics of disaster risk. Risk and
resilience factors inform the ways in which vulnerable populations are the nexus between a
natural disaster and devastating consequences. I apply Chmutina’s findings in Why natural
disasters aren't all that natural to assert that calling them 'natural disasters' artificially naturalises
the responsibility the United States carries for bolstering foreign vulnerability to natural hazards
through neoliberal policies, as exemplified in the case study of Hurricane Mitch.171
In Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters Phil O'Keefe, Ken Westgate and Ben
Wisner argue that the term natural disaster is a misnomer because these disastrous outcomes
primarily emanate from socio-economic factors as opposed to natural factors.172 Underdeveloped
countries are more frequently affected by natural disasters and the increased vulnerability to
natural hazards is linked with the process of underdevelopment in a vicious cycle. Population
growth and widening income inequality take place simultaneously which has a detrimental
impact on the standard of living for the poor as the minority continue to control wealth and
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natural resources. In turn, the neoliberal project of fighting poverty by offering developmental
assistance fails as the impoverished population is left vulnerable to the economic consequences
of environmental disasters while the rich get richer. This leads O'Keefe to the conclusion that,
"social processes such as economic 'development' can affect natural systems, 'causing' famine
and soil erosion. The ultimate cause of environmental problems may well be traceable to the
structural imbalances between rich and poor countries, and we would be right to replace the term
natural with the more appropriate term social or political disaster.”173
This suggestion rings true in Honduras where US neoliberal policies made the country
vulnerable to the impacts of natural disasters. Due to its location, Honduras has long been
susceptible to hurricanes, flooding, and earthquakes as one the most disaster-prone countries in
Central America.174 Above these natural circumstances, massive disparities in the distribution of
wealth have resulted in extremely vulnerable living conditions for the poorest communities. In
Honduras, “the wealthy siphoned their share of the top and corruption compounded the prevalent
economic inequality as money flowed in from international sources like neoliberal policies that
resulted in 60% of all companies being controlled by US firms in 1989.”175 Widening economic
inequality and the failures of development made impoverished communities in Honduras
vulnerable to the effects of Hurricane Mitch.
Similarly, in Nicaragua this theory is supported by the fact that the disastrous impacts of
Hurricane Mitch were exacerbated by US and foreign development practices, though the
hurricane itself was a naturally-occurring phenomenon. Chavez Metoyer found that relief aid
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from agencies such as the IMF, World Bank, and IDA tends to sacrifice the interest of the poor
and economic development to its higher priority, debt repayment.”176 This shows that natural
hazards do not qualify as natural disasters, in Nicaragua’s case inappropriate development
increased the population’s vulnerability to Hurricane Mitch.
Though he applies it to international aid as opposed to immigration protection,
Bowdoin’s Tulio Zille comes to a similar conclusion as starts the essay “Natural” Disaster,
International Solidarity, and the Representation of Others: Lessons from Haiti with the premise
that natural disasters are not natural. He writes that, “the problem was not so much to dispute the
call to solidarity in a moment of catastrophe, but the quick move to making the audience the
main subject of the situation. Understood as a natural disaster, it was hard to question the ethics
of a call to action and intervention. Given that we perceived the disaster as not induced by
humans, there could be no question as to the necessity to intervene, and it became harder to
interrogate the complicity of other nations in the magnitude of the disaster.”177 In effect, the
environmental disaster basis for TPS designation allows the United States to avoid taking
responsibility for the insecurity and vulnerability they created through neoliberal policies.
For subsequent extensions of Temporary Protected Status, economic factors emerged as
the primary justification for extending the designation while employing the lasting
environmental impacts of Hurricane Mitch as the justification for prolonged protection. In the
third step of the TPS designation process, “the Secretary of Homeland Security exercises in
deciding whether to initially designate a country for TPS. For an existing designation, the
Secretary determines whether country conditions warrant an extension or termination of TPS.”
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Though the US government highlighted the climate and environment as the primary cause of
instability in Honduras and Nicaragua in the initial designation, they considered a broad range of
factors when analyzing country conditions and the ability of their respective governments to
handle the return of its nationals. As is visible in Figures 2 and 3, after environmental and
ecological driving factors, economic motivators are the primacy justification for continued
protection for Honduras and Nicaragua under TPS. Bill Frelick affirms that most of the situations
Temporary Protected Status addresses are chronic. These factors are not exceptional and
temporary, they are normal and protracted. To attribute a non-deportation rationale to an
environmental disaster makes sense in the immediate aftermath, but after a point, the credibility
of a designation on the basis of environment alone is lost. As such, both the “temporary”
component of TPS and the environmental crisis-based trigger for the designation are both
misleading. TPS is triggered due to chronic systemic shortcomings that are rarely ever resolved
within a reasonable time frame.

Figure 2
Country Conditions Factors Cited by the U.S. Government in TPS Designation and Extensions
for Honduras
Country Conditions Factors Cited by the U.S. Government in TPS Designation and Extensions
for Honduras
Climate and Environment
● Hurricane Mitch (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011,
2013, 2014, 2016)
● Drought (2002, 2003, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Deforestation (2013)
● Erosion (2010, 2013)
● Earthquakes (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014)
● Floods/flood concerns (1999, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Forest fire concerns (2010)
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● Landslides or mudslides/landslide concerns (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Pollution of water sources (2011, 2013)
● Subsequent hurricanes and tropical storms
○ Hurricane Michelle, 2001 (2002, 2003)
○ Hurricane Beta, 2005 (2006)
○ Tropical depressions (2010, 2011, 2013)
○ Tropical storms (2011, 2013, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Torrential/heavy rains (2010, 2011, 2013, 2016)
● Coffee rust epidemic (2014, 2016)
Economy
● Economic losses/decreased economic activity/economic stress (2002, 2003, 2007,
2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016)
○ Crop failures/damage to crops (2006, 2013, 2014, 2016)
○ Industrial and tourist sectors (2010)
○ Shrimp industry (2014)
● Long-term development challenges (2007, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016) x Poverty (2010,
2011, 2013, 2016)
● Poverty (2010, 2011, 2013, 2016)
● Reliance on outside/international assistance (2000, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010,
2011, 2013)
● Unemployment/underemployment (2002, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2016)
○ Youth unemployment (2011)
○ Coffee industry (2014)
○ Agricultural sector layoffs (2016)
Infrastructure
● Homes damaged or destroyed/housing needs (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Schools damaged or destroyed/educational system incapacity (2003, 2006, 2007, 2010,
2011, 2013, 2014)
● Hospitals/health centers damaged or destroyed (2003, 2011, 2013)
● Sanitation/sewage/water system damage (2003, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2013, 2014)
● Impact to road network/bridges (2002, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014,
2016)
● Access to electricity (2004, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013)
● Vulnerability to further damage by adverse climatic conditions (2007, 2010, 2011,
2013, 2014)
Public Health
● Deaths/fatalities (2002, 2003, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016
● Food/water insecurity (2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Malnutrition (2003)
● Health system incapacity (2006, 2007, 2010, 2014, 2016)
● Drought-related impacts on hygiene (2016)
● Disease (2014, 2016)
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● Dengue and chikungunya in 2014 and 2015 (2016)
Safety and Security
● Population displacement (2002, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Homelessness/shelter housing (2000, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2013, 2014)
● Security concerns/potential for escalating violence (2011)
Governance
● Political crisis in 2009 (2010)
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Figure 3
Country Conditions Factors Cited by the U.S. Government in TPS Designation and Extensions
for Nicaragua
Country Conditions Factors Cited by the U.S. Government in TPS Designation and Extensions
for Nicaragua
Climate and Environment
● Hurricane Mitch (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013,
2014, 2016, 2017)
● Drought (2002, 2003, 2014, 2016)
● Deforestation ()
● Erosion (2004)
● Floods/flood concerns (1999, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Forest fire concerns ()
● Landslides or mudslides/landslide concerns (2007, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Pollution of water sources (2004, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017)
● Subsequent hurricanes and tropical storms
○ Hurricane Michelle, 2001 (2002, 2003, 2014)
○ Hurricane Beta, 2005 (2007)
○ Tropical depressions (2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014)
○ Tropical storms (2002, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017)
● Torrential/heavy rains (1999, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016,
2017, 2018, 2019, 2020)
● Coffee rust epidemic (2007, 2011, 2014, 2016)
Economy
● Economic losses/decreased economic activity/economic stress (2000, 2002, 2003,
2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2017)
○ Crop failures/damage to crops (2007, 2010, 2011, 2014)
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●
●
●
●

○ Industrial and tourism sectors (2007)
○ Shrimp industry ()
Long-term development challenges (2008, 2010, 2013, 2014)
Poverty (2010, 2016)
Reliance on outside/international assistance (2000, 2001, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014,
2017)
Unemployment/underemployment (2002, 2008, 2010 )
○ Youth unemployment ()
○ Coffee industry (2007, 2011, 2014, 2016)
○ Agricultural sector layoffs (2007, 2013, 2014, 2016)

Infrastructure
● Homes damaged or destroyed/housing needs (2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011,
2013, 2014, 2017)
● Schools damaged or destroyed/educational system incapacity (2002, 2003, 2010, 2011,
2013, 2014, 2016)
● Hospitals/health centers damaged or destroyed (2002, 2003, 2011, 2013)
● Sanitation/sewage/water system damage (2004, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2017)
● Impact to road network/bridges (2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013,
2014, 2016, 2017)
● Access to electricity ()
● Vulnerability to further damage by adverse climatic conditions ()
Public Health
● Deaths/fatalities (2014)
● Food/water insecurity (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2016)
● Malnutrition (2011)
● Health system incapacity (2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016)
● Drought-related impacts on hygiene (2002, 2003, 2014, 2016)
● Disease ()
● Dengue and chikungunya in 2014 and 2015 ()
Safety and Security
● Population displacement (2010, 2011, 2013)
● Homelessness/shelter housing (2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2013, 2014, )
● Security concerns/potential for escalating violence ()
Governance
● Political crisis in 2009 (2011)
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This is highlighted in the country condition report in which the embassy of Tegucigalpa
recommended an extension of TPS for Honduras with planning for the end game in mind. The
report published on February 14, 2003 emphasized that, “Honduras remains an extremely poor
country, still trying to recover from the devastation of Hurricane Mitch. While most USG-funded
post-Mitch reconstruction efforts are complete, serious long-term challenges make the situation
extremely difficult for the average Honduran. Honduras is still struggling to provide economic
opportunities, health care, housing, and schooling for its current citizens, and possibly another
87,000 that might return in Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is not extended.”180
In the same breath as the report claimed Honduras is still trying to recover from the
devastation of Hurricane Mitch, the report also indicated that, “with the help of the international
donor community (of which USAID is the largest bilateral contributor), Honduras has largely
recovered from the physical devastation of Hurricane Mitch and has begun to focus its efforts on
the country's long-term development.” In turn, TPS offers protection from the economic impacts
of environmental disasters in a covert manner because of the political ramifications of protecting
migrants whose countries are dealing with chronic economic problems.
In the case of Nicaragua, the 2014 extension for Temporary Protected Status represents
how economic considerations are prominent in the extension of protections while nevertheless
employing the environment as a catch-all apparatus. On January 5, 1999, the Attorney General
designated Nicaragua for TPS based on an environmental disaster that impacted the country and
more fifteen years after Hurricane Mitch the Secretary determined the conditions warrant an
extension because, “Nicaragua’s poor economy has slowed down reconstruction efforts,
undermining Nicaragua’s capacity to absorb additional Nicaraguan nationals. The regions of
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Nicaragua most devastated by Hurricane Mitch continue to be the poorest and least developed in
the country. Weak global commodity prices and decreased profits for Nicaraguan exports will
negatively impact the country’s gross domestic product.”181 Though most of the TPS
designations for the Central American and Caribbean countries have occurred following natural
disasters, the economic crises they seek to address are chronic as exemplified by the fact that the
Hurricane Mitch induced recession has not ended 15 years after the natural disaster.
It is impossible to isolate climate and environmental factors from economic factors in a
foreign national's ability to safely return to their country of origin. Though the scientific basis for
climate change is well established, empirical analysis of the impacts of climate change on human
populations is lacking. An International Organization for Migration report on Migration and
Climate Change suggests that one of the reasons for the lack of scholarship on this topic is
partly, “because individual migrants’ decisions to leave their homes vary so widely: deciding
causality between economic “pull” and environmental “push” is often highly subjective. And
finally, disaggregating the role of climate change from other environmental, economic and social
factors requires an ambitious analytical step into the dark.”182
Establishing a causal relationship between climate change and forced migration is very
difficult. Research on environmental migration has fallen into two broad categories: the
“maximalist” school and the “minimalist” school. The maximalists claim that environmental
change is the driving force of migration. On the other hand, the minimalists claim that the
environment is only a contextual factor among a myriad of causal variables in migration
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decisions. In Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict Suhrke
analyzes the effects of environmental degradation on migration patterns to create definitions of
who and who is not an environmental refugee. Suhrke most closely aligns with the minimalist
school which, “focuses on the impact of a particular process such as land degradation,
deforestation or changing climate on migration.” On the other hand, the maximalist, “tend to
extract the environmental variable from a cluster of causes and proclaim the associated
outmigration as a direct result of environmental degradation.” 183
By accommodating a broad range of factors that drive migration, TPS embraces a
minimalist perspective and acknowledges it is difficult to isolate environmental change as the
cause of continued insecurity for migrants from countries affected by natural disasters. In turn,
the program recognizes that environmental disasters like Hurricane Mitch compound Central
America’s pre-existing economic insecurity. Both Honduras’ and El Salvador’s persistent
poverty is the consequence of widening inequality, perpetuated by the region’s vulnerability to
environmental disasters and TPS fills a protection gap in the refugee regime by acknowledging
the economic and environmental drivers of vulnerability, though the environment continues to be
a catch-all tool.
Chapter 4: Conclusion
Temporary Protected Status is a blunt instrument that uses the environment as a catch-all
designation for deeper social, economic and political conditions, but it is often the only
instrument available in the U.S. to fill the gaps left for vulnerable migrants that do not meet the
1951 Convention criteria. Though TPS fills a gap in US law by providing de facto protections to
migrants fleeing environmental disasters, the environment is being used as a catch-all tool for
183
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more systemic economic and political vulnerabilities in Central America. The process of
preference falsification explains why the U.S. government is highlighting the environment as the
reason for continuing TPS protection instead of the economic, humanitarian, social, conflict,
political or economic country conditions factors cited in TPS designations and extensions for El
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. According to the economist Timur Kuran, “preference
falsification is the act of misrepresenting one’s wants under perceived social pressures.”184
Because stated preferences respond to social pressures, the United States is more likely to
advocate for continued protection of immigrants using the environment because it is perceived as
neutral compared to more polarizing drivers of migration. As governments tailor their choices to
what appears socially acceptable, Temporary Protected Status continues to be the leading
humanitarian protection for people fleeing environmental disasters that are understood as
socially palatable justifications for continued protection. Kuran found that a consequence of
preference falsification is the preservation of unpopular structures:
Francis Cornford once suggested that “nothing is ever done until every one is convinced
that it ought to be done, and has been convinced so long that it is now time to do
something else.” The just-discussed mechanism offers a possible reason why widely
desired changes might fail to materialize. When large numbers of people conceal their
misgivings about the status quo, individuals may consider their own disenchantments
exceptional. They may think that they are in conflict with the rest of society and hence
that by being truthful they would only invite trouble. Through preference falsification,
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they may thus hold in place structures that they could, if only they acted together, easily
change. 185
The United States is continuously employing the environment to depict natural disasters which
took place two decades ago as the reason for continued protection because it allows the
government to accommodate migrants fleeing climate catastrophes while not expanding the
existing definition of a refugee. As a result of preference falsification, we accept that “natural
disasters are the root cause of structural inequalities in Central America” and that “TPS is
working” though everyone knows this program is flawed because there is not the political will to
change it.
Though TPS has been a lifeline for hundreds of thousands of Central Americans when
conditions in their home country prevent them from returning safely, TPS is a widely disliked
instrument that has been challenged by people on both sides of the immigration debate. On the
one hand, critics echo the words of Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) who held that there is nothing
so permanent in US immigration law as a temporary status.186 Though TPS is a statutory tool that
is depicted as a temporary reprieve from deportation, critics point to the ways in which migrants
are seldom deported because their status expired as evidence that TPS has an 18-month
expiration date, but the de-facto legal status of recipients who have been here for upwards of two
decades is in fact permanent. In effect, TPS is a form of amnesty not a temporary reprieve from
deportation.
On the other hand, advocates have highlighted that one of the primary shortcomings of
TPS is that the program is highly politicized and lacks transparency as immigration concerns are
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weighed heavily. In Creating a More Responsive and Seamless Refugee Protection System: The
Scope, Promise and Limitations of US Temporary Protection Programs Donald Kerwin
discusses that, “the legislative expansion of US temporary protection programs and the effective
use of current programs and legal authorities depend heavily on political will. The executive
branch enjoys broad discretion to offer temporary protection in different forms.”187 U.S.
temporary protection programs rely on executive discretion and the process of TPS designations
and extensions is particularly subject to political pressure. Immigration concerns and political
considerations influence the TPS process which explains why designations that have been
depicted as temporary have historically been extended well after natural disasters struck Central
America. The 2001 Earthquakes are still cited, granting TPS to Salvadorans for 20 years and
Hurricane Mitch is still being cited, granting TPS for Nicaraguans for 22 years. In effect, TPS
has become a form of protection for de facto refugees and individuals in refugee-like situations
that continues to be cited due to compelling political reasons.
Though the political process of extending TPS status for Central American recipients has
“worked” in that it has granted recipients with de facto amnesty, advocates also argue that TPS is
inadequate because it fails to provide comprehensive protection for migrants facing
environmental destruction in their countries of origin. TPS holders gain important benefits from
their status that allow them to contribute to their communities including a reprieve from
deportation and work authorization. Recipients may also apply for special permission to travel
outside of the U.S. with approval from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
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(USCIS).188 In spite of this, these benefits are largely illusory because recipients can never
achieve the true integration and full membership within American society that is awarded to long
term permanent residents because TPS is temporary.
While TPS enables recipients to be integral parts of their communities through their
economic, social, and civic contributions, TPS does not provide a pathway to permanent legal
status in the country. In “Give Me Your Tired our Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses”: The
Case our Huddled Masses”: The Case to Reform U.S. Asylum Law to Protect Climate Change
Refugees, Flanagan refutes the claims made by critics who frame TPS as permanent amnesty
when he notes that the, “result of TPS is people being forced to return to their home country once
the temporary disaster has been resolved, no matter the length of time it takes to resolve that
issue, and regardless of whether the conditions are temporary or recurring.”189 In turn, advocates
hold that TPS is not well suited to provide relief to migrants who flee their home country due to
climate change-related environmental disasters because recipients are thrust into a quasipermanent status.
Despite the shortcoming of TPS, advocates continue to fight for the program because it is
currently the only form of humanitarian relief designed to accommodate those unable to safely
return to their country of origin due to environmental destruction. One of the consequences of
preference falsification is that, “social structures with known flaws cease to be challenged, and
their alleged benefits come to be accepted as self-evident.”190 Though this highly politicized
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process is precarious, advocates continue to support TPS because there is no real alternative to
this program.
The situation created by TPS can be described as an unstable status quo since doing
nothing to replace this inadequate mechanism is preferable because TPS is one of the oldest
instruments for protection within the U.S. humanitarian protection regime. Despite its unstable
character, the status quo offers many advantages. Refugee advocates are conflicted about the
benefits of replacing TPS and are not insistent on substituting the program with a new form of
protection, recognizing that temporary protection serves humanitarian objectives.191 Because of
this stable equilibrium, advocates are confronted with the choice between challenging the status
quo because it is insufficient or opting in favor of the “stability" currently offered by the status
quo, despite long term challenges it may pose. In Private Truths, Public Lies The Social
Consequences of Preference Falsification, Kuran explains that a consequence of preference
falsification is the spiral of silence which describes, “the process whereby reformists capable of
instituting change jointly sustain the status quo.”192 TPS advocates are in no way silent however,
they play a role in maintaining an institution that places recipients in precarious legal situations
because it is preferable to maintain the status quo than to face the risk of losing protections for
hundreds of thousands of migrants.
Advocates are failing to challenge this program because it is an inadequate instrument but
it's the only instrument they have. In one clear example of this, more than 500 immigration
advocates that have historically demanded a more comprehensive humanitarian protection
program that TPS called on the Biden administration to re-designate Haiti under the Temporary
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Protected Status (TPS) program.193 TPS is a public lie because despite it being a flawed structure
that has caused frustration for advocates and critics alike, advocates have accepted that the
government is using natural disasters as a justification for continued extensions as long as it
guarantees temporary protection to de facto refugees that are vulnerable to the termination of
their country's designation.
Though TPS has become a form of de facto amnesty, vulnerable populations are held in
cycles of liminal legality because of the political nature of these decisions. Temporary Protected
Status recipients remain in state of liminal legality in the United States since they enjoy the
benefits of de facto amnesty but their future rests on a political designation within the sole
prerogative of the president and the Department of Homeland Security. Natural disasters are
framed as an apolitical catch-all condition for continued protection, yet the environment is
becoming increasingly politicized. The environment is a catch-all tool for continued protection
only insofar as it is not recognized as political. The human dimensions of environmental
insecurity are real for communities on the ground but in the context of TPS, distant
environmental disasters are being employed to extend these policies. Currently, one of the two
reasons we can grant protection to migrants who cannot return to their country of origin is
because of a natural disaster, otherwise Congress which enacted TPS and the Secretary of
Homeland Security which renews TPS might not extend these protections. Despite this, it is
getting harder to see the environment as an apolitical problem which threatens the future of TPS.
In turn, Temporary Protected Status’ liminal legality leaves immigrants at the mercy of changing
political opinions.
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Though there was a precedent set as TPS was historically extended and re-designated
under both Republican and Democratic administrations due to ongoing environmental
conditions, President Trump came into office and tried to effectively end TPS by phasing out
immigrant humanitarian protections. As a part of former President Donald Trump’s broader
efforts to tighten restrictions on immigration, Nicaraguans were the first community to lose their
special permission to live and work in the U.S. under TPS.194 After repeated extensions, acting
Homeland Security Secretary Elaine Duke announced her decision to terminate TPS designation
for Nicaragua because, “those substantial but temporary conditions caused in Nicaragua by
Hurricane Mitch no longer exist, and thus, under the applicable statute, the current TPS
designation must be terminated.”195 Officials from the Department of Homeland Security said
the termination would be delayed one year and become effective Jan. 5, 2019 to allow for an
orderly transition. This signaled the beginning of the end of Temporary Protected Status as
President Trump departed from the precedent set by previous administrations that repeatedly
allowed foreign nationals to live and work legally in the United States.
Following the decision to terminate TPS for Nicaragua, nearly 200,000 Salvadorans who
have called the US home since Hurricane Mitch shook the nation 20 years ago saw their special
deportation protection threatened when the Trump administration announced it was terminating
their protection in July 2019. In the case of El Salvador, the Department of Homeland Security
determined that, “the original conditions caused by the 2001 earthquakes no longer exist. Thus,
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under the applicable statute, the current TPS designation must be terminated.”196 Salvadorans in
the states were given 18 months to figure out their future, after which time they could face
deportation. Consequently, the Trump administration also announced it was ending TPS for
nearly 90,000 Hondurans living in the United States since Hurricane Mitch devastated the
country, saying they must return home. Homeland Security Secretary Kristen Nielsen repeated
the reasoning used to terminate El Salvador and Nicaragua’s status with the finding that, “the
disruption of living conditions in Honduras from Hurricane Mitch that served to the basis for its
TPS designation has decreased to a degree that it should no longer be regarded as substantial.”197
Shortly after, a federal judge temporarily blocked Trump’s attempt to end Temporary Protected
Status protection for 300,000 immigrants from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti and Sudan.198 In
spite of this, a 2-1 ruling from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the decision by the
lower court, allowing Trump to terminate humanitarian protections for migrants who established
their lives in the U.S. The panel found that the Department of Homeland Security secretary
“possesses full and unreviewable discretion as to whether to consider intervening events in
making a TPS determination.”199 In other words, this designation has become more precarious as
administrations have full discretion on how to interpret the TPS statute. Currently, the future of
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TPS recipients in the United States hinges on the preliminary injunction ordered by the court in
Ramos, et al v. Nielsen remains in effect.
Trump’s policies represent that de facto policy while in practice, has no protection. Any
administration can change it because it has not been inscribed into law. The lives of Temporary
Protected Status recipients who depend on this designation for their continued protection is
particularly tenuous because TPS grants them de facto amnesty, without the security that comes
with permanent resident status. The Trump administration alluded to this when Secretary of
Homeland Security Kirstjen M. Nielsen stated that, “only Congress can legislate a permanent
solution addressing the lack of an enduring lawful immigration status of those currently
protected by TPS who have lived and worked in the United States for many years.”200 In effect,
designations will continue to shift according to political opinions because it is not the
responsibility of the executive branch to find a permanent solution for TPS, it is up to Congress.
Temporary Protected Status has expanded the de facto definition of a refugee by
recognizing the climate as a persecuting agent and providing amnesty to migrants fleeing
environmental disaster. Despite its benefits, TPS could be made a much more effective
instrument that would do a better job at protecting the people it aims to safeguard if U.S policy
makers had the political will to change it. In turn, temporary protection would be reserved for
mass influxes that would be truly temporary when an individualized system is overwhelmed as
opposed to extending the designation for chronic conditions. In the meantime, we do not have
this form of humanitarian protection, so TPS is stressed and stretched to fill in for major gaps in
the refugee regime. Policy makers need to think of strategies to address the political nature of
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Temporary Protected Status because the times of the environment existing as apolitical are
coming to an end and TPS does not provide as strong of a protection as a comprehensive change
to U.S. immigration policy. Environmental reasons like intensification of climate change and its
various effects are a legitimate rationale for continued protection but when the environment is
being used as a catch-all for chronic issues, it delegitimizes TPS as an apparatus and its ability to
respond to environmental disasters. The intersectionality of causal mechanisms will increase, on
the one hand the environment is being used when it isn't the sole reason for continued protection
but increasingly, climate change is an important reason why communities are displaced and
unable to return to their countries of origin. If TPS continues to be misused and distant natural
disasters are highlighted as the sole reason for protection, critics will claim that climate change is
not a legitimate driver of displacement. Consequently, it will become more complicated as time
goes by to isolate environmental drivers of migration because economic and environmental
factors will be more interlinked.
Though TPS has had some real utility and provided relief for the U.S. asylum system,
developing a way for foreign nationals in the United States for over two decades to adjust their
status will improve the efficiency of our asylum system as a whole. Just last month on March 18,
The House voted 228-197 to pass the American Dream and Promise Act of 2021. The bill
provides a pathway to citizenship for Dreamers and Temporary Protected Status recipients, with
nine Republicans joining all Democrats in voting for this piece of legislation.201 TPS recipients
would be eligible for adjustment of status if they were otherwise eligible for temporary protected
status on January 1, 2017 and if they have been continuously physically present in the United

201

Axios. “House Passes Bill Providing Pathway to Citizenship for Dreamers and Those with Temporary Protected
Status.” Yahoo News, March 8, 2021. https://news.yahoo.com/house-passes-bill-providing-pathway220541636.html.
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States for a period of not less than 3 years.202 Though it remains to be seen whether the Senate
approves the American Dream and Promise Act or its own version titled the Dream Act of 2021
that Sens. Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) introduced last month, this is a step
in the right direction in providing permanent protection for long-term TPS recipients left in
uncertain limbo.
Temporary Protected Status has the potential to provide meaningful protection and if we
can acknowledge that people who have established their lives in the U.S. need permanent legal
status and the assurance that they will not be deported, our whole system will be more efficient
and more effective in providing protections for people that need it. The asylum system is broken
and TPS is not working effectively, so policy makers must look these systems together to secure
protections for TPS holders stuck in limbo.

202
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